THE TRUT ABOUT MONITARY PAPER TRADE and
THE WAYS IN WHICH STREETBROKER AND FRAUDSTERS WORK.
If you wish to contact me:
Telefon: +49 (0) 2162 890 6163 or
Telefax: +49 (0) 2162 890 6088 or
E-Mail: Tourintertrust@yahoo.com
Joszach69@yahoo.de
franzschulz@yahoo.de
My name is Manfred J. Zachel, if you want to know more about the International Syndicates please read CHAPTER 5 and 6
================================================================
THE REASON WHILE I FIGHT AGAINST THIS SORT OF CRIME IS THAT THOUSANDS OF ORDINARY PEOPLE LOSE THEIR SAVINGS OR ASSETS TO THOSE FRAUDSTERS AND END UP IN POVERTY, SOME OF THEM EVEN COMMITTED SUISYDE, LOST THEIR FAMILY AND FRIENDS, THAT HAS TO BE STOPPED.
===================================== “Project Hammer” has been rightly described as “a nondescript name of something that’s awful hard to define
The operation called “Hammer” has passed into unwritten history, but a residue of cosmic proportions remains in the off ledger nether-world of Citibank New York.
A sum of USD 223 104 000 008.03 (as at December 1991) is hidden in the limbo of daily ledger closing. It is a composite of 30 or more accounts for various people (personalities / corporations / governments,), better described as “clients “, around the world _ in one solid block at Citibank.
For each of the accounts there is said to be a broker and an investor (entity?). The investors appear to have abandoned their principle; the Brokers have never been paid any commission. Nor have the investors ever received any interest, or earnings.
The Hammer funds would be hidden in Citibank off- ledger account, escaping detection in suspense in spite of inspections. A means of evasion was to alter the account number/s to a manageable degree, with details known only to the custodian / “trustee”(sic).
Corresponding Banks to Citibank New York are, according to Wamboldt’s schematic:
Bank of America, Toronto, Canada
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Toronto, Canada
Security Pacific Bank, Los Angeles, California
Federal Reserve
Not included in Wamboldt’s schematic, but claimed for Eastech Bank and Eastcorp by Riaan Stander and Van Rooyen, (South African Citizen and Business man) and confirmed by Canadian auditors MC IVOR and Associates, is;
Bank of Mexico
A considerable amount of information has been provided by
Brigadier-General Earle COCKE Jun U S Army (retired)
A further aspect is the assertion that - especially in the 1960’s - funds were used for arms sales, as well as to generate funds for military Operations: (the Iran-Contra rebels transactions of the 1980’s has also been suggested);
A later development was the use of the funds for trading in collateral bank instruments, based on the funds.
“Individuals, corporations, and even governments. Certainly it is said, “the funds arose to the credit of people (surely not excluding public and private organisations) who had engaged in some kind of trading programme.”
Street brokers (Fraudster) work with all tricks to get hold on your money or at last on your personnel- and bank dates as can be seen below;
We, the Crime fighter, received from various sources per E-Mail offers with the possibility of very high profits;
The following further observations may be made:
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
CONTRACT AWARDING COMMITTEE
ECOWAS HEADQUARTERS
LOME,TOGO
Hello,
Good Day Sir/Madam,
I am PRINCE STEVE IKPEM,The Chairman, Contract
Awarding Committee of the ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST
AFRICAN STATES ( ECOWAS)with Headquarters in LOME,TOGO,
I am in search of an agent to assist us in the transfer of Twenty Million United States Dollars only.)into your personal or company`s bank account. And subsequent investment in properties in your country.
you will be required to:
(1) Assist in the transfer of the said sum
(2) Advise on lucrative areas for investment
(3) Assist us in purchase of properties.
If you decide to render your service to us in this regard,
20% of the total sum will be offerred to you.
10%will be set aside for any expences encountered during the transfer.
Pls, quickly get back to me.
Your faithfully,
STEPHEN IKPEM
Chairman of the contract award committee{CCAC
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SOS Aldeas Infantiles. Ningún niño sin hogar.
http://ad.doubleclick.net/clk;15734310;7829128;i?http://ad.es.doubleclick.net/clk;15339847;11200040;r?http://www.aldeasinfantiles.es/aldeas/microsite/index.htm
and
Sir/madam
I have a premonition that you could be trusted to assist me in effecting a fund transfer into your nominated account. As such I strongly believe it that you will not sit on our fund when it finally gets into your nominated account.
You see, we are top officials of the Federal Government Contract Review Panel who are interested in importation of goods into our country with funds which are presently trapped in Nigeria in order to commence this business we solicit your assistance to enable us transfer into your account the said trapped funds.
The source of this fund is as follows:- During the last regime here, some Government officials set up companies and awarded themselves contracts which were grossly over-invoiced in various Ministries.
The present Government set up a Contract Review Panel and we have identified a lot of inflated Contract Funds, which are presently floating in the Central Bank of Nigeria ready for Payment.
However, by virtue of our position as civil servants and members of the Panel, we cannot acquire this money in our names. I have therefore, been delegated as a matter of trust by my colleagues of the Panel to look for an Overseas partner into whose account we would transfer the sum
of US$20,500,000.00 (Twenty Million, Five Hundred Thousand United States Dollars) only.
Hence we are writing you this letter, we have agreed to share the money thus:
1) 25% for the account owner (you)
2) 70% for the Officials (us)
3) 5% will be for settling of taxation and all local and foreign expenses. It is from the 70% that we wish to commence the said business.
We would want you to furnish us with your full particulars such as your
Name, Telephone Numbers, Fax Numbers,Please
Best regards,
Mr Adede Anthony
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SOS Aldeas Infantiles. Ningún niño sin hogar.
http://banner.eresmas.com/adclick/CID=0000642fc858344d00000000/site=ERESMAS/area=ERESMAS.CORREO/aamsz=PIE_WEBMAIL
We responded as follow;
Dear Sir / Madam
I received your message-dated 29.04.05 and I'm interested in your offer.
I would like to get some more information from you
1 - What is it I have to do?
2 - Are these transactions legal?
3 - are you only interested in goods or also in purchase of properties or give
Loans to corporations or private persons? .
4 - gives your Bank a " Certification " of clean and legal origin*?
5 - has the properties you are interested in to be located only in Germany?
6 - send me please a draft of the contract, to be proved and signed by a notary.
You see, nobody give away $ 4,000,000 for nothing but, as I mentioned above, I am interested and, if it is legal, I am your Agent
If there are any questions please don't hesitate to contact me.
Best regards
Mr Manfred Zachel
(Gen. - Manager)
but;
we never received an respond, way?
We didn’t send the requested information, only an CONFIRMATION with questions. And, as expected there was NO RESPONCE AT ALL.
Fraud net
Launched at the beginning of 2004, Fraud net is a unique CCS initiative that aims to become the worlds' leading network of law firms specialising in white-collar crime.
The network brings together an unrivalled team of specialists in fraud, asset tracing and recovery, money laundering and cybercrime, who are able to assist fraud victims in most jurisdictions throughout the world.
Many fraud cases involve complex offshore havens that can present a complex legal minefield for victims. Successful prosecution and asset recovery in these situations requires the expertise and experience found in only a small number of legal firms.
A positive step in tackling the global problem of fraud and asset recovery, Fraudnet hopes to provide effective and straightforward solutions to the increasing numbers of victims being targeted by fraudsters.
Fraud victims and others needing assistance in relation to business crime are invited to contact any of the Fraudnet members listed.
For an application form to join Fraud net and details of membership benefits please email Peter Lowe at ccs@icc-ccs.org
CCS conference to examine fraud and money laundering
London, 3 October 2005
The 10th Annual FIB Conference will take place in London on 13th and 14th October, 2005
Everyone in business knows that financial fraud is a growing threat. The question is how best to deal with it. No financial services business is immune and now there is increasing pressure by regulators upon the industry to meet international standards of know-your-customer.
A conference of top experts on the subject, to be held in London on 13-14 October 2005, aims to provide an in-depth examination of the nature of fraud and money laundering. Actual case studies will be used to highlight the methods of criminals preying on various financial sectors.
The conference is organized by the International Chamber of Commerce’s Commercial Crime Services (CCS) division. It will be the tenth annual conference of CCS’s Financial Investigation Bureau (FIB), a specialist unit, set up in 1992, which focuses on business crime and plays an important part in the fight against fraud and money laundering.
Captain Pottengal Mukundan, Director of CCS, said: “The conference updates delegates on the modus operandi of recent financial scams and how they may be avoided. The exchange of topical information on real cases is one of the important benefits of such a meeting.
“In past years, discussion at the conference has helped bankers identify fraudsters who have approached financial institutions. It is an essential event for compliance and anti-money laundering officers of banks.” The conference will also be of interest to regulators and law enforcement agencies.
A special feature of the conference will be the launch of the ICC CCS Extranet, an online service which will provide up-to-the minute information on commercial crime to FIB members.
For more information contact:
Pottengal Mukundan
Director
Commercial Crime Services
Tel: +44 20 8 591 3000
Fax: +44 20 8 594 2833
Email: ccs@icc-ccs.org.uk
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Maritime House
1 Linton Road
Barking
Essex IG11 8HG
United Kingdom
Black-listed Nauru banks re-emerging
London, 6 June 2005
The re-emergence of blacklisted financial institutions pose a risk to banks and investors
ICC’s Financial Investigation Bureau (FIB) is warning that several blacklisted Nauru-registered banks still appear to be in operation. In 2002, the South Pacific island was designated a money laundering concern by the US Department of the Treasury. Since that time, financial dealings between US financial institutions and any Nauru-licensed institution have been prohibited.
FIB Assistant Director Jon Merrett stated: “It appears some of the blacklisted Nauru financial institutions, which went quiet for a time, are re-emerging and are attempting to disguise their origins. No doubt they hope people will have forgotten the three-year-old designation, or perhaps believe they can persuade them they are dealing with an entirely different entity.”
The prohibition followed the introduction of the USA Patriot Act in October 2001. A number of amendments were made to the anti-money laundering provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act, directly targeting some 400 offshore banks that had no physical or legal residence anywhere else in the world. The Act also addressed concerns about effective banking supervision on islands where money laundering was not a criminal offence, where no customer identification records were required, and where there was no obligation to report suspicious transactions.
As a consequence, all US financial institutions remain disallowed from opening or maintaining in the United States any account for a foreign financial institution if the account involves Nauru or any institution licensed by Nauru. The only exemption is the Bank of Nauru, which also serves as the Central Bank.
The FIB is concerned that some banks may be unwittingly trading with or maintaining correspondent relationships with blacklisted Nauru financial institutions.
Mr Merrett stated: “We have seen recent instances where US banks have failed to realise they are dealing with a Nauru bank on the US treasury list. Often the names of the blacklisted banks are the same or very similar to credible banks. Clearly, this can be confusing and is an easy trap to fall into. Given the penalties for trading with discredited financial institutions, the FIB strongly recommends taking steps to find out exactly who you are dealing with.”
To avoid confusion and reduce the risk of inadvertently compromising compliance obligations, it is recommended that concerned financial institutions contact the FIB for clarification.
The FIB has catalogued a complete list of all the Nauru banks and financial institutions named by the US Department of the Treasury. In instances where banks finds themselves dealing with one of the blacklisted financial institutions, the FIB can offer a number of protective measures including tracking assets, and or the necessary steps to exit any correspondent relationship.
To take advantage of this service, financial institutions should email fib@icc-ccs.org for full details.
Trade Finance Documents Authentication
Fake or false trade and transport documents feature in the majority of modern maritime frauds and are the greatest menace facing the international trading community.
Financial institutions, traders, insurance companies, shipping agents and other intermediaries all rely on transport documents such as Bills of Lading, Seaway Bills, Airway Bills, CMR and FCR when making decisions. A document that appears genuine can induce a bank to pay for goods or finance a trade. It can prompt an insurance company to grant cover on a ship or shipment, or indemnify a fraudulent claimant. It may lead a shipping agent to release a cargo to someone that is not entitled to it.
It is important to remember that any document can be forged. In the maritime industry, fake documents mostly copy the style of a legitimate trader and it can be difficult for a non-experienced eye to spot the difference.
With many years experience and a sound knowledge of what to look for, our Information Department has a large number of resources at its disposal that can swiftly confirm the authenticity of transport documents. We make a number of independent checks with the parties named on documents and others, and these quickly indicate whether there is a cause for concern. We will then flag this up to our member and make further enquiries to determine exactly what is wrong and, more importantly, who is responsible.
Our tried and trusted system has proved invaluable on many occasions and is one of the best ways to verify the performance of the underlying transaction.
Anjouan banks suspect
London, 19 September 2005
FIB identifies vulnerabilities in Anjouan banks
The ICC's Financial Investigation Bureau (FIB), has received numerous reports of irregularities stemming from banks registered in Anjouan, Comoros Islands, off the east coast of Africa. Specifically, the FIB has learned of several incidents where offers of trade financing, commercial lending or asset-backed lending were made against false financial instruments such as Letters of Credit, Standby Letters of Credit, and Bank Guarantees.
Banking regulations in Anjouan have become complicated and unpredictable following a series of conflicts internal to Anjouan financial authorities. Officals at these agencies have been accused of issuing inappropriate licences to offshore banks. It is highly probable that these offshore banks do not have sufficient assets to support the issue of certain financial instruments.
Attempts by the FIB to clarify who has the authority to issue bank licences in the area have failed. Jon Merrett, the FIB’s Assistant Director stated: “A number of people on Anjouan claim to have the authority to issue bank licences, but their credibility remains heavily suspect."
The credibility of the Anjouan banking industry has been further undermined by one discredited bank that succeeded in having its details registered in a leading business directory. The bank, which is well known to the FIB, was able to get the listing after producing financial statements and testaments of good practice.
A number of the transactions resulting from the directory listing have since been called into question. The business directory owners responded quickly to remove the listing, but it is feared that there may be many other victims who have yet to realise that their trades or loans may have no substance.
According to FIB research, the bank that managed to get itself registered in the business directory is said to have been granted a licence in 2000 and have 38 employees. Since 2003, the FIB has received numerous reports that this institution issued fraudulent, worthless Letters of Credit and Bank Guarantees, often for several millions of dollars. A number of new complaints were reported to the FIB this summer. Based on these reports, the FIB is currently investigating this bank on behalf of several companies.
Mr Merrett noted, “The bank in question does not appear to have a physical location. The address stated to be in Ireland is not registered. A second Anjouan bank that had its licence revoked in 2003 is still issuing illegal documents and has recently negotiated a deal with two North Korean banks to set up another offshore institution."
Mr Merrett added, “Given the current uncertainty in this region, it is advisable that anyone having dealings with an Anjouan registered banking entity or any financial transaction connected with the island take immediate steps to verify the worth of the financial instruments involved and the credibility of the institutions or individuals they are transacting with."
The FIB provides financial investigation services to members. Non-members can find out more by contacting by email at fib@icc-ccs.org.
Monday, 26 February 2007
My Life - How the fraudster works
High-Yield Investment Programs
(HYIPs) & Bank Debentures
How about risk-free and guaranteed returns of 30% per week on your investments, generated from super-secret off-balance-sheet trading by prime European banks? Or, how about some Medium-Term Notes issued by the U.S. Federal Reserve which are deeply discounted so that the effective rate of return is 80% profit to you. 1933 Chinese Bonds paying 1,000% interest, anybody? All of this sounds pretty good, but it's completely bogus and the hottest financial scam going these days.
This section starts here.
• Exhibit: QUATLOOSIAN HYIP PROGRAMS
Keep getting burned by HYIP and MTN deals? Well, courtesy of the Synergized Debentured Netdom of Quatloosia, we bring you a list of certified programs that are sure to make you join the ranks of the super-rich. With these deals, you cannot lose -- just call up the Ferrari dealership and tell them to stay open a little later tonight. All the top programs by all the top performers, all rolled into one simple list so that you can choose your winner.
NEW! - PIPS Scams (People in Profit System)
NEW! - U.S. Department of Justice Explanation of Prime Bank/High-Yield Investment Schemes
• Exhibit: OMEGA TRUST & TRADING, LTD.
This exhibit chronicles the life and times of Mr. Clyde Hood, a former Fortune 500 trader and one of only 5 traders in the entire world who can pull off multi-billion dollar bank debenture deals to benefit humanitarian programs worldwide. All you have to do is invest $100 and you'll get that back plus $5,000 in only 9 months. Smell a rat? Tens of thousands of people across America didn't, and trusted Mr. Hood -- who was really just a retired electrician with a history of petty crime living in Mattoon, Illinois -- with tens of millions of dollars, sent to him via FedEx in $100 bills wrapped in aluminum foil. Now, Clyde and about a dozen others from Mattoon are enjoying the hospitality of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, while amazingly some people still believe that he will come through for them -- but this time for millions of dollars per $100 invested.
Includes:
Omega Promoters Admit Guilt
U.S. Attorney's Press Release
Latest Stupid Omega Rumors
More Latest Stupid Omega Rumors
The Omega Chronicals
• Exhibit: NESARA SCAM
An old prime bank scam doesn't die . . . it just hires space aliens to depose the Bush Administration and keep the hope of funding alive. The "true NESARA law" is exposed as a front for an elaborate donations scam run by some of the same people that helped to perpetuate the Omega Trust & Trading scam, although now with the most bizarre of New Age cultish overtones. Bizarre and funny all at once. Includes:
Dove Updates
Dove Doo Doo
Prosperity Programs - NESARA - Omega Forum
Jennifer Lee Updates
Deep Knight Updates
Mother Sekmet vs. Tony-the-Wonder-Llama
Morganthau Bonds
HYIPs & Bank Debenture News & Articles
South African fraud group that includes ex members of the South African High Commission Diplomatic core and intelligence department.
Sir, what worries me is that you have named some of them that are directly linked to the fraud group that scammed my fiance, they are:
Gerhard Laubscher.
Dr Hans R Balzer.
Please check this web site: www.filippinetti.com
Click the " About " button at the top, next to the service button
This gives details of all the directors linked to Peter Wolfgang Filippinetti.
Check all the directors, most are South African, some are Russian.
I have other names you may identify, they are:
Chris Du Toit. ex South African High Commission.
Diplomatic Core.
Maarten Adriaan Schalekamp.
Louis Mendes.
Christopher Shaw.
Jurgen Peter Blume. ( German )
Kenneth John Wilson. South African.
Jacob Barak.
Nohar Sarjoo.
Salah Bin Zaal.
David Stockard.
Saiff Durbar.
Peter Alexander Wilberforce Moss.
High-Yield Interest Programs, Bank Debentures
& Bank Debenture Trading Programs,
and Prime Banks Programs
OPEN FORUM: Securities Fraud -- Due Diligence in Finance Stock and Bond Fraud, including Boiler Rooms / Pump and Dump Schemes, Mutual Fund & Hedge Fund Fraud, FOREX scams, plus Churning, Private Placements, Venture and Bridge Funding, IPO’s, Verticals’ Fraud, HYIP and Prime Bank scams, MTNs, Historical Notes, Recovery Schemes, etc.
This is one of the most common financial scams. The scam artists will a wild tale of fortune including some or all of the following.
The scam artists will spin a long line of hokey nonsense relating to the post-World War II Bretton Woods accords, “off-sheet” financing by the “Top 50” worldwide banks, and “guaranteed” or “risk-free” trading. They will tell you that they (or somebody they are working for) is “one of only five (or six, or seven, or eight – or whatever number they pull out of the air at that particular moment) traders in the world who are familiar with these types of trades and are capable of pulling them off.” They will tell you that these trades are done at the “$100M” level only, but that miraculously you can start off with a very small amount of money and margin yourself into a $100 million position. Alternatively, they tell you that you can get a bunch of friends together and “pool” the necessary funds.
They will also tell you that they or whoever they are working for has done these trades for fifteen or twenty years, and have secretly made hundreds of millions of dollars. They are allowing you to do these trades instead of doing them themselves because they have made enough money and want to help you benefit some church, charitable, or humanitarian purpose. They will tell you that there is “NO WAY” that you money can disappear, and that it will sit in your own bank account unmolested until your hundreds of millions arrive. They will tell you that you can make astronomical interest rates, such as 20% to 80% per week, and that exponentially your profits will skyrocket.
How the Scam Artists
Get Your Money
The scam artists prey on your lack of financial sophistication. If you money was truly “not at risk” there would be absolutely no reason to have to put it up. Yet, the scam artists come up with a bunch of bogus tales about “off-balance sheet financing” and other hooey that convinces you to do one of the following:
+ You deposit your money in an account with a “Prime Bank” such as Citibank (which doesn’t know the scam is being perpetrated). The scam artists forge a letter of credit which they then exercise and transfer your money offshore, never to be found.
+ You deposit your money in an account with a “Prime Bank” such as Credit Suisse (which doesn’t know the scam is being perpetrated). The scam artists didn’t tell you that the account is a “correspondent account” held in that bank for their own bogus bank that they formed, and they simply transfer your money offshore, never to be found.
+ The scam artists convince you to put your money in a safe deposit box. Later, they tell you that it is stupid to keep money in cash where it is not earning interest. Instead, they say they will get “the traders” to accept a “bond”, such as a Houston Railroad Bond or an Imperial Chinese Bond that earns astronomic rates of interest. Only much later do you discover that the bonds are completely worthless.
And so forth and so on. Once your money has been deposited in the bank, there are about a hundred different ways for the scam artists to get at it.
THE LIES MADE TO PERPETRATE THE SCAM
"A big lie is more plausible than the truth."
-- Ernest Hemingway
Complete Lie: "There is a secret banking system where the big banks make astronomical returns, and you can't participate unless you pool with others or place your money with someone who has an place in the system."
This is a COMPLETE LIE, and anyone who says this is a scam artist. We regularly work with the major offshore banks, and have any friends and acquaintances at these banks, and can tell you that they laugh at the allegation that there is a "secret" banking system that produces crazily high returns as the promoters of the bank debenture scam suggest.
COMPLETE LIE: "The U.S. government is covering up this secret banking system."
This is a COMPLETE LIE that the U.S. government is somehow covering up this phantom banking system. This is NOT TRUE and anyone who says this is a scam artist. First, as shown above, it doesn't exist. Second, trading in currency is tightly monitored by literally hundreds of private groups worldwide, and even a small trade would instantly be recognized by these private groups.
COMPLETE LIE: "The program uses International Chamber of Commerce Approved Forms."
The International Chamber of Commerce does NOT approve forms for these programs, and anyone who claims this is a scam artist. To the contrary, the International Chamber of Commerce has put out warnings that it has not approved any such forms, and that forgers are illegally making up such documents without either the knowledge or approval of the ICC. Other forgeries that have been found include forgeries of documents purporting to be from the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), the U.S. Department of Treasury, the Bank of England, and even the Queen of England!
If you see anywhere in the scam artists' materials that they or their forms are "approved" by the ICC run! This is the baldest of lies.
COMPLETE LIE: "These securities do not need to be registered with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission or the State Securities Commission of the state wherein they are marketed or sold."
This is NOT TRUE and anyone who says this is a LIAR. To the contrary, when legitimate bank debentures are sold to the public, they are ALWAYS registered with the Securities Commission of the state wherein they are sold, and in most cases are also registered with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission. IF YOU CANNOT CALL YOUR STATE SECURITIES COMMISSIONER AND CONFIRM THAT THE DEBENTURES HAVE BEEN REGISTERED, IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT THEY ARE BEING MARKETED AND SOLD ILLEGALLY.
Private Placement Lies: Many scam artists will pitch that their schemes are somehow exempt from regulation because they are a "private placement". The truth is that many states require private placements to be registered, and at any rate if the scheme raises over $2 million aggregate amongst the states (i.e., $2 million anywhere) it MUST registered with the Securities & Exchange Commission!!!!! So, if someone says that they have raised $20 million dollars but they are not registered, it aren’t a legitimate deal.
COMPLETE LIE: "There is a major U.S. bank which guarantees these instruments."
This is NOT TRUE and anyone who says this is a LIAR. The scam artists will tell you that they cannot disclose the identity of the U.S. bank which guarantees the investment, or else will tell you the name of whichever bank they pull off the top of their head, but either tell you that you should not contact the bank directly, or they get one of their scam artist buddies to call you up and represent that they are a bank officer. No U.S. bank participates in these schemes, period, and many of them issue warnings to the public not to get involved in these scams.
A recent variation of this scam is for the scam artists to set up an offshore bank with a name that is very similar to an international bank, such as "Barclays International Bank" (which doesn't exist and plays off the Barclays name). These offshore banks never have any real assets or backing, and their guarantees are worthless.
COMPLETE LIE: "Others have made money with these programs."
Nobody except the scam artists have ever made money with these programs. A few people have gotten a small portion of their money back, usually for helping the scam artist scam somebody else, and that is it. We've seen hundreds of these scams the past year, but not a single person who could actually document that they made even a single penny over what they invested into it.
People who claim that they have made money on these programs always fall into one of two categories:
• Ringers, being persons set up and in cahoots with the scam artists to claim that they have made money; and
• Suckers, folks who have been scammed and are now going along with the scam artist on the condition that the scam artist will repay them a portion of their money lost for getting new suckers into these programs.
COMPLETE LIE: "These programs are back by or involved with the International Monetary Fund."
This is a total load of bull hockey (see Notice at right). The IMF has repeatedly warned about this scam.
So, if somebody claims that their investment has IMF involvement, you know it is a total lie.
RESOURCE Prime Bank/High Yield Investment Schemes
Report from the Fraud Section, Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.
FINALLY! An HYIP Program that Works! - Parsons Heritage Offshore Opportunities Ltd. is the ONLY prime bank and HYIP program that YOU can trust! Strongly Endorsed by Quatloos!
RESOURCE HYIPs and Prime Bank Notes: Fact or Fraud?
Expose of Prime Bank Notes, Corporate Roll Programs, Medium Term Notes, Bank Guarantees, Letters of Credit, and Stand By Letters of Credit, written by Investor Data Exchange.
HYIP/PRIME BANK/BANK DEBENTURES CASES
• United States of America v. Parr
• United States of America v. Rattan Lal Aggarwal
• United States of America v. Arthur R. Andrews
• United States of America v. Gary D. Bolin
• United States of America v. Richard C. Gravatt
• United States of America v. Grady Lewis Hand
• United States of America v. Edward Keith Howick
• SEC v. John D. Lauer and Clifton Capital Investors L.P.
• United States of America v. Herbert J. Lewis and Vernon Abrahams
• United States of America v. James F. Moored
• National Council Of The Churches Of Christ In The USA v. First Union National Bank Of Virginia
• United States of America v. Delton Owen Olson
• United States of America v. Joseph Polichemi, ET AL
• United States of America v. Al Richards, Roger Braugh, and Kurt Latrasse
• United States of America v. Morreon B. Rude
• United States of America v. William Martin Valuck
• United States of America v. Suzanne Wonderly
Home General Fraud Tax Scams Investment Fraud Quatloosia! Quatlosers
Law Enforcement Forums Sitemap Report From Quatloosia! New
If You Have Been Scammed or Have Been
Approached by Promoters of this Scam
Call your local FBI branch immediately, and tell them how you have been approached. Call also your state's securities commission. Contact the SEC at their Online Complaint Center. Cooperate with law enforcement -- maybe you can help them to catch the promoters!
If you have signed one of the "Secrecy and Confidentiality" agreements (however it may be titled) please be advised that the agreement is NULL AND VOID because it is part of an illegal agreement -- that is, you CANNOT be successfully sued because you signed one of these hokey forms and later went to law enforcement to lodge a complaint. Promoters often try to threaten people when they want their money back that they will be "sued" for violating the agreement, but the plain fact is that these agreements have no effect as a matter of law because the underlying scam transaction was invalid.
Note also that if you are a VICTIM of this scam, you have done nothing wrong and will not be prosecuted for cooperating and assisting authorities. Therefore, there is NO REASON NOT TO CONTACT THE AUTHORITIES to at least help prevent someone else from being scammed.
Finally, the BEST WAY that you are going to get your money is by way of a Victim's Restitution Order. That is, if the person who has scammed you is convicted, they will have to pay you your money back before they will be released from parole. This is another reason that you should immediately go to the authorities and disclose the fraud.
THE END GAME
Once a victim has figured out that he or she won't be getting their money back, they are then often lead into the "end game" where they will essentially assist in the fraud. The line the promoter will give is this: "Look, I can't give you your money back unless you bring someone else to me. Bring someone else to me, and I will give you a cut of their money." If the victim goes along, the victim is now also a promoter, and is guilty of fraud, securities fraud, embezzlement, and aid & abetting fraud, securities fraud, and embezzlement -- so don't go along: Turn the promoter in to the authorities instead!
As mention above, the BEST WAY to get your money back is to file criminal charges against the promoter, and seek a Victim's Restitution Order. Not only does this offer you your best hope of getting at least a portion of your money back, but it will also take the promoter off the street and hopefully save somebody else from being sucked into this scheme.
Please note that when someone tells you that they have made these astronomical returns off the program, it usually means that they have already been scammed, and are trying to get you into it so that they can re-coup part of their investment. Well, turn these folks in to the authorities, too, because they are no better than the original scam artist.
DENIAL
Like any other scam, people who have been scammed with these programs go into denial that they even have been scammed.
Many people can't get over the mental barrier that they have lost everything. The only thing they have to live for is the hope that their money might come back, and we have seen people wait for years even after the scam artist has completely vanished and they don't even know who to call to check on their investment. But they still sit around, thinking that someday, somehow, a check for millions will somehow miraculously appear in their mailbox.
Many people are embarrassed because they have been scammed. They've told their family and friends about this great investment, and simply can't face them to say that they did something stupid.
Many people are culpable because they have also gotten their family and friends to invest in these programs, and even if the scam artist can't be found, they will go to jail for aiding and abetting the felony sale of securities without a license, embezzlement, etc.
Well, all you folks who fall into these categories NEED TO WAKE UP AND SMELL THE COFFEE. Your money is gone, vamoosed, and you will never, ever get it back. The least you can do is report your losses to the police and to the FBI so that at least they can stop the scam artist before they hurt someone else.
STUPID ARGUMENTS
About twice a month, we get actually get calls from the scam artists themselves, posing from everything from an interested investor to an attorney acting on behalf of one of the roll programs. These idiots offer all sorts of B.S., arguing that their program is somehow "different" or that they have "guaranteed returns" or other such nonsense. Notably, they almost all hang up when we suggest that if their program is so good, that they should take it to the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission and register it!
Again, we have seen literally hundreds of these programs over the last several years but we have YET to see even a single legitimate one. Not one!
THEY DO NOT EXIST
Every couple of weeks, some sucker who is about to be scammed calls us and says essentially "I've read your website but isn't it possible that some of these might be for real?"
No! Hell No!
None of these are for real, period. This scam has been going on for years, and to date NO program has been legitimate. If you can't find the proposed program investment in either the Wall Street Journal or the London Financial Times, and if it has not been registered with your State Securities Commissioner, then it is a scam. Any and all reasons why it is not so listed are the purest of lies.
During the course of the last several years, we have seen hundreds of these programs, but we have yet to see a real one! If there is a real one out there, we'd like to know because it would be the first. We're not holding our breath, however.
[Please do not send us information to evaluate these programs, unless you also send us the U.S. address of the promoter so that we can forward this information to law enforcement for them to check against their records.]
© 2002-2005 by Financial & Tax Fraud Associates, Inc.. All rights reserved. No portion of this website may be reprinted in whole or in part without the express, written permission of Financial & Tax Fraud Associates, Inc. This site is http://www.quatloos.com. Legal issues should be faxed to (877) 698-0678. Our attorneys are Grobaty & Pitet LLP (http://grobatypitet.com) and Riser Adkisson LLP (http://risad.com).
Office Supplies Frauds & Scams
Material provided with the permission of Les Henderson & crimes-of-persuasion.com
Highly Recommended!
Les Henderson's Crimes of Persuasion
crimes-of-persuasion.com
A comprehensive look at schemes, scams & frauds
Book available from Amazon and other retailers
ISBN 0-9687133-0-0
Bogus Invoices / Office Supplies
Businesses, churches, and fraternal and charitable organizations are being bilked out of millions of dollars by bogus office supply firms. You can protect yourself by learning to recognize the scams and understanding your rights.
The typical office supply scam involves goods or services that you routinely order: copier paper, toner and maintenance supplies, equipment maintenance contracts, or classified advertising. When fraudulent telemarketers call, they often lie to get you to pay for items you didn't order, or to get you to pay more than you agreed to.
They take advantage of holes in your organization's purchasing procedures or of unsuspecting employees who may not be aware of office practices. What's worse, the office supplies peddled by these bogus firms are often overpriced and of poor quality and the services are usually worthless.
Phony-invoice Scams
Schemers know that a business sometimes makes mistakes or can be careless in its accounting, so they prey on these weaknesses. Lifting names from mailing lists, business registers, the Yellow Pages or published advertisements, swindlers send "pro-forma" invoices for supplies and services. However, the invoice may be a solicitation in disguise and in very fine print contain the following disclaimer:
"This is a solicitation. You are under no obligation to pay unless you accept this offer."
Although the law states that it is illegal to send such a solicitation without the disclaimer being conspicuous and in large print, there are those who flout the regulations and send disguised solicitations.
Authorized Buyer
One goal of the phony-invoice scam is to get the name of an employee before your organization is shipped and billed for unordered goods or services. They use various ploys to do so such as asking for help completing an order, claiming that "the accounting department lost the name of the person we should send these supplies to," or they may ask for the name of the person in charge of your advertising or purchasing.
The phony invoice, which includes the employee's name as the "authorized" buyer, arrives a week or so after, for two reasons.
First, the inflated price, as much as ten times what you'd pay for the same goods from a legitimate supplier, is less obvious if the invoice arrives after the merchandise has been received and stocked.
Second, the chances are good that you've used the merchandise before the invoice arrives. Many organizations mistakenly believe that they must return unordered merchandise or pay for unordered merchandise before they've used it.
The Pretender Scam
In the pretender scam, the caller may pretend to be your regular or previous supplier, a replacement, or an "authorized" supplier. By convincing you that the goods or services and prices offered are the same as before, the caller hopes you won't bring up prices, quantities, and brands. Even if you do, the seller may try to brush you off by saying, "We've supplied you in the past, but it's been a while," or "The price is the same as last time."
If you insist on a price quote, the seller may give a price that sounds reasonable for one carton but is actually for a single unit, such as "$19.95 in a carton of 10," meaning the carton price is 10 times $19.95, or $199.50.
They can misrepresent the quality, quantity, type, price, or brand name. For example, the toner for your Xerox copier may not be Xerox brand toner. Some scam artists try to duplicate brand name packaging; others sell half a carton of merchandise at the full-carton price.
In another twist, the caller uses high-pressure tactics to rush your purchase decision and dodge questions about price, quantity and brand names. The seller may falsely claim that prices are going up soon, someone was forced out of business, a warehouse is overstocked, or a limited inventory of government surplus is available. Or that a computer glitch delayed notification of a price increase, but, as a courtesy, an order has been reserved for you at the "regular" or "old" price.
He may misrepresent the purpose of the call, saying that he's calling to send you a promotional item such as a cordless screwdriver, free samples, or a catalogue so you'll "think of him next time you order."
If you send back the single toner cartridge they sent uninvited, they may call up and say you kept one of the two they sent, so pay up.
Or the seller may claim that he's conducting a survey of office equipment or updating company records, leading you to believe that he's the regular or previous supplier. Before hanging up, the caller may mention, in passing, actual merchandise. "I'll send that screwdriver to you right away … and while I'm at it, I'll throw in a few deodorant blocks." Soon, a shipment arrives, matching your equipment supplies, followed by a bill.
The Gift-Horse Scam
The gift-horse scam tries to create mistrust within an organization. The scheme starts when the caller tricks an employee into accepting a gift or a free promotional item, with a passing reference to merchandise or services. You then receive overpriced, unordered merchandise, followed by an invoice with the employee's name.
When the organization questions the employee, the fraudulent seller is betting that the employee will be nervous about the gift when he denies placing the order. The hope is that the organization will doubt the employee. When this scheme works, the organization believes that the employee blundered into ordering something that must be paid for.
They may also target a person with the authority to sign cheques, then work on their fear of job loss, while sending escalating and persistent invoicing, despite continued "last one" promises. They may even threaten to notify higher-ups of the personal gifts if the false bills are not paid.
Though they rarely blackmail people in this fashion, one scammer's efforts eventually had several bookkeepers charged with embezzlement with the continued use of the phrase "You still have a balance due on your account!"
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24 Hour Scamming
One group was charged for sending invoices to organizations, including churches and non-profit organizations, for unordered computer repair service contracts. Their mailings indicated that they were "renewals" or "upgrades of service" to previous contracts, or warned that an account was "past due." Their solicitations also provided an 800 number for consumers to call for "unlimited maintenance and repair services" including assistance by telephone. The FTC alleged that the defendants rarely, if ever, provided the promised services to consumers.
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Paper Pirates and Toner Phoners
One "toner bandit" scheme defrauded numerous medical and dental providers who were induced to pay false and fictitious invoices for high priced, unordered and undelivered copy machine toner.
Supply Distribution Centre set up customer service telephones and mail boxes through which to operate the false billing scheme. Fictitious invoices charging $274.95 or $283.92 for one carton of unordered copy machine toner were printed and mailed out to various businesses and institutions. About $14,000 in victims' checks was deposited into their account while about $140,000 worth was cashed at a liquor store.
Victims who complained about the invoices to them or to consumer protection agencies had their invoices cancelled in an effort to reduce complaints and hide the scheme. No toner was ever shipped to victims who paid the initial invoices. Instead, they simply received another invoice billing them for another shipment of unordered toner.
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Willing To Clean You Out
Perpetrated through a company that used the names of Sharp Industries, Saturn Industries, Polaris Industries, Trans-America, and Chem. Tech, one telemarketing scheme defrauded thousands of victim companies including nursing homes, churches, hotels, schools, hospitals and other organizations nationwide out of over $12 million during a five-year period.
They caused the victim companies to pay exorbitant prices for maintenance supplies such as penetrating oil, silicone spray, trash bags, and other products they ordered. For example, a case of penetrating oil (12 cans per case) was commonly charged to the victims at approximately $420 for one case (12 cans - $35 per can), when the same product was purchased wholesale for approximately $30 ($2.50 per can).
In addition to charging grossly inflated prices to unsuspecting customers they would also send gifts or kickbacks to the home addresses of purchasing agents to induce them to pay the exorbitant prices charged on the sales invoices.
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We Have To Keep Moving
Complaints from a real estate firm, a trucking company, a hospital, a school district, and a non-profit agency describe phone calls from a young woman, claiming that her father is closing his office supply business in a nearby town and moving the business. She claims the supplies are offered "at cost" or "very cheap," and quotes specific prices.
The supplies are shipped, but the invoice amounts are higher than expected. Totals have been reported of $292 to $1,922. In some cases the original price quoted turned out to be "per item," rather than "per box" and did not reflect the price quoted over the telephone.
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After the Invoice Arrives
Scam artists can spend significant time and energy on collection efforts. They will send as many invoices as it takes to get your money. Invoices often are stamped "Past Due." In extreme cases, they'll resort to real or bogus collection agencies and threats of legal action, preceded by dunning letters.
An organization that pays for unordered goods or services also may be targeted for additional scams or "reloaded." For example, the seller may send a second shipment of "back ordered" merchandise and another bill, or bills for service upgrades.
Additional invoices follow as long as you continue to pay. The con artist also may sell your organization's name to other scam operators, or convert to another bogus operation and target you with a new scheme.
The Brush-off
When organizations complain that they didn't order the merchandise or services or that the price is too high, the scam seller reacts in some predictable ways:
• Bullying. The seller argues with you if you express any uncertainty about whether the supplies or services were ever ordered: "They were ordered. We have a recording of Mr. Jones. If you don't pay, we can take you to court."
• Negotiating. Here, the seller agrees to accept a lower price. After all, the goods and services are so grossly overpriced that almost anything the seller gets is profit. If you complain about price, the seller may say, "You were charged what? They must not have given you the discount for...." The seller then tries to negotiate "a better deal." Sometimes, the seller appeals for sympathy: "We really need the business. I'll let you have it for...."
• Charging for returned merchandise. The seller claims you can return merchandise if you pay a "restocking fee." In fact, the fee is often more than the goods are worth. Similarly, the seller may try to get you to pay shipping charges to return the items.
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How To Avoid Supply Scams
You can protect your organization from paying for unordered goods and services. Here's how:
1. Know your rights. If you receive supplies or bills for services you didn't order, don't pay, and don't return the unordered merchandise. You may treat unordered merchandise as a gift.
By law, it's illegal for a seller to send you bills or dunning notices for unordered merchandise, or ask you to return it, even if the seller offers to pay for shipping.
Further, if the seller sends you items that differ from your order, you may treat the substitutions as unordered merchandise. Unordered services are treated the same way. However, first consider the possibility that the seller made an honest mistake.
2. Assign designated buyers and documents your purchases. For each order, the designated employee should issue a purchase order, electronic or written, to the supplier with an authorized signature and a purchase order number.
The order form should instruct the supplier to note the purchase order number on the invoice and bill of lading. The buyer should send a copy of every purchase order to your accounts payable department. Keep blank order forms secure.
3. Check your documentation before paying bills. When merchandise arrives, the receiving employee should verify that it matches the shipper's bill of lading, paying special attention to brands and quantity, and your purchase order. Refuse merchandise that doesn't. If everything's in order, the employee should send a copy of the bill of lading to your accounts payable department.
Bills for services should be reconciled the same way. A supplier should not be paid unless the invoice has the correct purchase order number and the information on the invoice, the purchase order and the bill of lading match.
4. Train your staff. Train everyone in how to respond to telemarketers. Advise employees who are not authorized to order supplies and services to say, "I'm not authorized to place orders. If you want to sell us something, you must speak to that person and get a purchase order."
Buy from people you know and trust. Authorized employees should be sceptical of "cold" or unsolicited calls and feel comfortable saying no to high-pressure sales tactics. Legitimate companies don't pressure you to make a snap decision. Finally, consider asking new suppliers to send a catalogue first.
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Ten Million Reasons Not To Realize
Edward Tunick, who faces seven to 10 years in prison for his January conviction on nine counts of mail fraud in federal court, was involved in telemarketing maintenance supplies for 12 years. By his own admission, his companies, which ran under multiple names, tallied gross receipts of more than $10 million in that period.
Suggesting that it took a jury trial to make him realize the error of his ways, Tunick said he did not realize until after his conviction that what he was doing was against the law.
He and his employees would call businesses offering products -- in his case, light bulbs and janitorial supplies, while avoiding the subject of price during their calls. Posing as long time suppliers to the victim companies and often offering gifts to employees to help persuade them to place an order, Tunick then would send the products to one address and the invoice, with marked-up prices, to another.
The scam works because large companies often fail to question invoices below a certain dollar value, usually $500. Fraudulent telemarketers know this so they keep sending bills for $200 or $300.
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Office Supply Outrage
27 Apr 2001
Thank you for having this web site!
I just got hit with this again today, and it's prompted me to write, warning everyone about this telemarketing scam.
Several years ago, I was working as an office manager for an architectural firm. One day I received a phone call from a guy who asked me if I could confirm the model number of the copier in my office. He acted very casual, as if he had been dealing with our company for years. Not knowing any better, I gave him the information.
Shortly thereafter, boxes upon boxes of copier toner arrived at my office. I had never authorized the purchase, but they had my name, and sent the product anyway. The boxes weren't marked distinctively, so I opened them to see what was inside. Mistake. As soon as you open a box, you cannot refuse it to the shipper. So I was stuck with a bunch of high-priced toner that I didn't want or need.
Let anyone who answers the phone for your company know about this telemarketing scam. There are two approaches the scum-suckers usually take:
1. A person will call and say something like, "Hi. This is Brian from the office centre. Could you confirm the model number of your copier for me?
2. A person will call and say something like, "Hi. This is Jen from your supply centre. I wanted to let you know that we just got a major price hike on your copier toner. But since you're such a good customer of ours, I'll make sure you still get it at the old price. Do you still have the Canon M217 (they'll just make up a copier model)?
As soon as you reply with, "What is the name of the company you are calling from?" or "What information do you have on our copier?" or anything that requests information of them, they will hang up on you.
I've tried to bust these people, but have not yet been successful. I've tried to do a "*69" (call back) on the phone, but they always have their number blocked. I've also checked my caller ID, but again, the number is always blocked.
When I got the packages that time, I tried tracing the return address - it was a fake address. They must have gone into a postage service centre, used cash to pay for the shipping, and given a false return address. And what about the invoice? A P.O. box.
Not sure what would have happened if I hadn't paid the bill, but I DID give them my name and I DID give them my copier model number. They could have argued that it was an authorized sale.
My point is, don't get yourself into this situation. If anyone calls you asking you for ANY information - personal, business or otherwise - DO NOT GIVE IT TO THEM! Ask for them to put their request in writing. If they're legit, they'll do it.
Please forward this to anyone who works in an office. I think this is important and could save people a lot of money and hassle (and possibly save someone their job!).
Let's beat these scumbags at their own game!
Melissa Hertzler
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No Fixed Address
Vermont Attorney General William H. Sorrell announced that his office has settled a consumer fraud lawsuit against Merchant Product Services (MPS)(3522318 Canada, Inc.), a telemarketing company based in Montreal, Quebec run by its president and director, Misha Artzy.
MPS, a seller of paper and ribbon for credit and debit card machines, had solicited orders by telephone from businesses all over the country, using the Vermont address of a mail handling facility in the town of Derby.
The Attorney General alleged that the defendants violated the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act by:
• Failing to disclose important terms of MPS' offer, namely, the price and quantity of the supplies that the defendants wished to sell.
• Failing to provide required disclosures of customers' three-day right to cancel their purchase over the telephone.
• Charging unconscionably high prices for their products-between 5.4 and 11.0 times the prices of comparable products sold by others.
• Misrepresenting that MPS was affiliated with the manufacturer of credit/debit card machines or served such machines, rather than that it was actually a seller of machine supplies.
• Misrepresenting the purpose of the defendants' telemarketing sales calls by creating the impression that their calls were intended to check on how potential customers' credit and debit card machines were working.
Although the defendants denied these allegations they agreed to a permanent ban on doing any business in or into Vermont, including using a Vermont address.
They are also required to pay $21,000 in full refunds to all of their Vermont customers; full refunds to all non-Vermont customers who have filed-or who may in the future file-a complaint with the State; $60,000 in civil penalties to the State; and $12,500 to reimburse the State for its fees in litigating the case-for a total of at least $93,500.
For further information on the settlement, businesses can contact the Attorney General's Consumer Assistance Program at 1-800-649-2424. October 9, 2001
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Free Can Be Expensive
02/02 - James W. MacDonald pleaded guilty to mail and a wire fraud conspiracy involving a $6 million dollar fraudulent telemarketing company in Boca Raton and New Jersey and was sentenced to nearly 10 years in prison.
He told his telemarketers to offer businesses free samples of cleaning and lighting supplies then later billed the companies for the supplies at prices inflated up to 4,500 percent, according to the U.S. attorney's office.
While the companies operated from 1989 to 1994, MacDonald was arrested in 1999. Three others, Darren Sturtevant, Philip Lynch, and Steven Green also pleaded guilty to the scheme and are awaiting sentencing.
(HYIPs) & Bank Debentures
How about risk-free and guaranteed returns of 30% per week on your investments, generated from super-secret off-balance-sheet trading by prime European banks? Or, how about some Medium-Term Notes issued by the U.S. Federal Reserve which are deeply discounted so that the effective rate of return is 80% profit to you. 1933 Chinese Bonds paying 1,000% interest, anybody? All of this sounds pretty good, but it's completely bogus and the hottest financial scam going these days.
This section starts here.
• Exhibit: QUATLOOSIAN HYIP PROGRAMS
Keep getting burned by HYIP and MTN deals? Well, courtesy of the Synergized Debentured Netdom of Quatloosia, we bring you a list of certified programs that are sure to make you join the ranks of the super-rich. With these deals, you cannot lose -- just call up the Ferrari dealership and tell them to stay open a little later tonight. All the top programs by all the top performers, all rolled into one simple list so that you can choose your winner.
NEW! - PIPS Scams (People in Profit System)
NEW! - U.S. Department of Justice Explanation of Prime Bank/High-Yield Investment Schemes
• Exhibit: OMEGA TRUST & TRADING, LTD.
This exhibit chronicles the life and times of Mr. Clyde Hood, a former Fortune 500 trader and one of only 5 traders in the entire world who can pull off multi-billion dollar bank debenture deals to benefit humanitarian programs worldwide. All you have to do is invest $100 and you'll get that back plus $5,000 in only 9 months. Smell a rat? Tens of thousands of people across America didn't, and trusted Mr. Hood -- who was really just a retired electrician with a history of petty crime living in Mattoon, Illinois -- with tens of millions of dollars, sent to him via FedEx in $100 bills wrapped in aluminum foil. Now, Clyde and about a dozen others from Mattoon are enjoying the hospitality of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, while amazingly some people still believe that he will come through for them -- but this time for millions of dollars per $100 invested.
Includes:
Omega Promoters Admit Guilt
U.S. Attorney's Press Release
Latest Stupid Omega Rumors
More Latest Stupid Omega Rumors
The Omega Chronicals
• Exhibit: NESARA SCAM
An old prime bank scam doesn't die . . . it just hires space aliens to depose the Bush Administration and keep the hope of funding alive. The "true NESARA law" is exposed as a front for an elaborate donations scam run by some of the same people that helped to perpetuate the Omega Trust & Trading scam, although now with the most bizarre of New Age cultish overtones. Bizarre and funny all at once. Includes:
Dove Updates
Dove Doo Doo
Prosperity Programs - NESARA - Omega Forum
Jennifer Lee Updates
Deep Knight Updates
Mother Sekmet vs. Tony-the-Wonder-Llama
Morganthau Bonds
HYIPs & Bank Debenture News & Articles
South African fraud group that includes ex members of the South African High Commission Diplomatic core and intelligence department.
Sir, what worries me is that you have named some of them that are directly linked to the fraud group that scammed my fiance, they are:
Gerhard Laubscher.
Dr Hans R Balzer.
Please check this web site: www.filippinetti.com
Click the " About " button at the top, next to the service button
This gives details of all the directors linked to Peter Wolfgang Filippinetti.
Check all the directors, most are South African, some are Russian.
I have other names you may identify, they are:
Chris Du Toit. ex South African High Commission.
Diplomatic Core.
Maarten Adriaan Schalekamp.
Louis Mendes.
Christopher Shaw.
Jurgen Peter Blume. ( German )
Kenneth John Wilson. South African.
Jacob Barak.
Nohar Sarjoo.
Salah Bin Zaal.
David Stockard.
Saiff Durbar.
Peter Alexander Wilberforce Moss.
High-Yield Interest Programs, Bank Debentures
& Bank Debenture Trading Programs,
and Prime Banks Programs
OPEN FORUM: Securities Fraud -- Due Diligence in Finance Stock and Bond Fraud, including Boiler Rooms / Pump and Dump Schemes, Mutual Fund & Hedge Fund Fraud, FOREX scams, plus Churning, Private Placements, Venture and Bridge Funding, IPO’s, Verticals’ Fraud, HYIP and Prime Bank scams, MTNs, Historical Notes, Recovery Schemes, etc.
This is one of the most common financial scams. The scam artists will a wild tale of fortune including some or all of the following.
The scam artists will spin a long line of hokey nonsense relating to the post-World War II Bretton Woods accords, “off-sheet” financing by the “Top 50” worldwide banks, and “guaranteed” or “risk-free” trading. They will tell you that they (or somebody they are working for) is “one of only five (or six, or seven, or eight – or whatever number they pull out of the air at that particular moment) traders in the world who are familiar with these types of trades and are capable of pulling them off.” They will tell you that these trades are done at the “$100M” level only, but that miraculously you can start off with a very small amount of money and margin yourself into a $100 million position. Alternatively, they tell you that you can get a bunch of friends together and “pool” the necessary funds.
They will also tell you that they or whoever they are working for has done these trades for fifteen or twenty years, and have secretly made hundreds of millions of dollars. They are allowing you to do these trades instead of doing them themselves because they have made enough money and want to help you benefit some church, charitable, or humanitarian purpose. They will tell you that there is “NO WAY” that you money can disappear, and that it will sit in your own bank account unmolested until your hundreds of millions arrive. They will tell you that you can make astronomical interest rates, such as 20% to 80% per week, and that exponentially your profits will skyrocket.
How the Scam Artists
Get Your Money
The scam artists prey on your lack of financial sophistication. If you money was truly “not at risk” there would be absolutely no reason to have to put it up. Yet, the scam artists come up with a bunch of bogus tales about “off-balance sheet financing” and other hooey that convinces you to do one of the following:
+ You deposit your money in an account with a “Prime Bank” such as Citibank (which doesn’t know the scam is being perpetrated). The scam artists forge a letter of credit which they then exercise and transfer your money offshore, never to be found.
+ You deposit your money in an account with a “Prime Bank” such as Credit Suisse (which doesn’t know the scam is being perpetrated). The scam artists didn’t tell you that the account is a “correspondent account” held in that bank for their own bogus bank that they formed, and they simply transfer your money offshore, never to be found.
+ The scam artists convince you to put your money in a safe deposit box. Later, they tell you that it is stupid to keep money in cash where it is not earning interest. Instead, they say they will get “the traders” to accept a “bond”, such as a Houston Railroad Bond or an Imperial Chinese Bond that earns astronomic rates of interest. Only much later do you discover that the bonds are completely worthless.
And so forth and so on. Once your money has been deposited in the bank, there are about a hundred different ways for the scam artists to get at it.
THE LIES MADE TO PERPETRATE THE SCAM
"A big lie is more plausible than the truth."
-- Ernest Hemingway
Complete Lie: "There is a secret banking system where the big banks make astronomical returns, and you can't participate unless you pool with others or place your money with someone who has an place in the system."
This is a COMPLETE LIE, and anyone who says this is a scam artist. We regularly work with the major offshore banks, and have any friends and acquaintances at these banks, and can tell you that they laugh at the allegation that there is a "secret" banking system that produces crazily high returns as the promoters of the bank debenture scam suggest.
COMPLETE LIE: "The U.S. government is covering up this secret banking system."
This is a COMPLETE LIE that the U.S. government is somehow covering up this phantom banking system. This is NOT TRUE and anyone who says this is a scam artist. First, as shown above, it doesn't exist. Second, trading in currency is tightly monitored by literally hundreds of private groups worldwide, and even a small trade would instantly be recognized by these private groups.
COMPLETE LIE: "The program uses International Chamber of Commerce Approved Forms."
The International Chamber of Commerce does NOT approve forms for these programs, and anyone who claims this is a scam artist. To the contrary, the International Chamber of Commerce has put out warnings that it has not approved any such forms, and that forgers are illegally making up such documents without either the knowledge or approval of the ICC. Other forgeries that have been found include forgeries of documents purporting to be from the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), the U.S. Department of Treasury, the Bank of England, and even the Queen of England!
If you see anywhere in the scam artists' materials that they or their forms are "approved" by the ICC run! This is the baldest of lies.
COMPLETE LIE: "These securities do not need to be registered with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission or the State Securities Commission of the state wherein they are marketed or sold."
This is NOT TRUE and anyone who says this is a LIAR. To the contrary, when legitimate bank debentures are sold to the public, they are ALWAYS registered with the Securities Commission of the state wherein they are sold, and in most cases are also registered with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission. IF YOU CANNOT CALL YOUR STATE SECURITIES COMMISSIONER AND CONFIRM THAT THE DEBENTURES HAVE BEEN REGISTERED, IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT THEY ARE BEING MARKETED AND SOLD ILLEGALLY.
Private Placement Lies: Many scam artists will pitch that their schemes are somehow exempt from regulation because they are a "private placement". The truth is that many states require private placements to be registered, and at any rate if the scheme raises over $2 million aggregate amongst the states (i.e., $2 million anywhere) it MUST registered with the Securities & Exchange Commission!!!!! So, if someone says that they have raised $20 million dollars but they are not registered, it aren’t a legitimate deal.
COMPLETE LIE: "There is a major U.S. bank which guarantees these instruments."
This is NOT TRUE and anyone who says this is a LIAR. The scam artists will tell you that they cannot disclose the identity of the U.S. bank which guarantees the investment, or else will tell you the name of whichever bank they pull off the top of their head, but either tell you that you should not contact the bank directly, or they get one of their scam artist buddies to call you up and represent that they are a bank officer. No U.S. bank participates in these schemes, period, and many of them issue warnings to the public not to get involved in these scams.
A recent variation of this scam is for the scam artists to set up an offshore bank with a name that is very similar to an international bank, such as "Barclays International Bank" (which doesn't exist and plays off the Barclays name). These offshore banks never have any real assets or backing, and their guarantees are worthless.
COMPLETE LIE: "Others have made money with these programs."
Nobody except the scam artists have ever made money with these programs. A few people have gotten a small portion of their money back, usually for helping the scam artist scam somebody else, and that is it. We've seen hundreds of these scams the past year, but not a single person who could actually document that they made even a single penny over what they invested into it.
People who claim that they have made money on these programs always fall into one of two categories:
• Ringers, being persons set up and in cahoots with the scam artists to claim that they have made money; and
• Suckers, folks who have been scammed and are now going along with the scam artist on the condition that the scam artist will repay them a portion of their money lost for getting new suckers into these programs.
COMPLETE LIE: "These programs are back by or involved with the International Monetary Fund."
This is a total load of bull hockey (see Notice at right). The IMF has repeatedly warned about this scam.
So, if somebody claims that their investment has IMF involvement, you know it is a total lie.
RESOURCE Prime Bank/High Yield Investment Schemes
Report from the Fraud Section, Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.
FINALLY! An HYIP Program that Works! - Parsons Heritage Offshore Opportunities Ltd. is the ONLY prime bank and HYIP program that YOU can trust! Strongly Endorsed by Quatloos!
RESOURCE HYIPs and Prime Bank Notes: Fact or Fraud?
Expose of Prime Bank Notes, Corporate Roll Programs, Medium Term Notes, Bank Guarantees, Letters of Credit, and Stand By Letters of Credit, written by Investor Data Exchange.
HYIP/PRIME BANK/BANK DEBENTURES CASES
• United States of America v. Parr
• United States of America v. Rattan Lal Aggarwal
• United States of America v. Arthur R. Andrews
• United States of America v. Gary D. Bolin
• United States of America v. Richard C. Gravatt
• United States of America v. Grady Lewis Hand
• United States of America v. Edward Keith Howick
• SEC v. John D. Lauer and Clifton Capital Investors L.P.
• United States of America v. Herbert J. Lewis and Vernon Abrahams
• United States of America v. James F. Moored
• National Council Of The Churches Of Christ In The USA v. First Union National Bank Of Virginia
• United States of America v. Delton Owen Olson
• United States of America v. Joseph Polichemi, ET AL
• United States of America v. Al Richards, Roger Braugh, and Kurt Latrasse
• United States of America v. Morreon B. Rude
• United States of America v. William Martin Valuck
• United States of America v. Suzanne Wonderly
Home General Fraud Tax Scams Investment Fraud Quatloosia! Quatlosers
Law Enforcement Forums Sitemap Report From Quatloosia! New
If You Have Been Scammed or Have Been
Approached by Promoters of this Scam
Call your local FBI branch immediately, and tell them how you have been approached. Call also your state's securities commission. Contact the SEC at their Online Complaint Center. Cooperate with law enforcement -- maybe you can help them to catch the promoters!
If you have signed one of the "Secrecy and Confidentiality" agreements (however it may be titled) please be advised that the agreement is NULL AND VOID because it is part of an illegal agreement -- that is, you CANNOT be successfully sued because you signed one of these hokey forms and later went to law enforcement to lodge a complaint. Promoters often try to threaten people when they want their money back that they will be "sued" for violating the agreement, but the plain fact is that these agreements have no effect as a matter of law because the underlying scam transaction was invalid.
Note also that if you are a VICTIM of this scam, you have done nothing wrong and will not be prosecuted for cooperating and assisting authorities. Therefore, there is NO REASON NOT TO CONTACT THE AUTHORITIES to at least help prevent someone else from being scammed.
Finally, the BEST WAY that you are going to get your money is by way of a Victim's Restitution Order. That is, if the person who has scammed you is convicted, they will have to pay you your money back before they will be released from parole. This is another reason that you should immediately go to the authorities and disclose the fraud.
THE END GAME
Once a victim has figured out that he or she won't be getting their money back, they are then often lead into the "end game" where they will essentially assist in the fraud. The line the promoter will give is this: "Look, I can't give you your money back unless you bring someone else to me. Bring someone else to me, and I will give you a cut of their money." If the victim goes along, the victim is now also a promoter, and is guilty of fraud, securities fraud, embezzlement, and aid & abetting fraud, securities fraud, and embezzlement -- so don't go along: Turn the promoter in to the authorities instead!
As mention above, the BEST WAY to get your money back is to file criminal charges against the promoter, and seek a Victim's Restitution Order. Not only does this offer you your best hope of getting at least a portion of your money back, but it will also take the promoter off the street and hopefully save somebody else from being sucked into this scheme.
Please note that when someone tells you that they have made these astronomical returns off the program, it usually means that they have already been scammed, and are trying to get you into it so that they can re-coup part of their investment. Well, turn these folks in to the authorities, too, because they are no better than the original scam artist.
DENIAL
Like any other scam, people who have been scammed with these programs go into denial that they even have been scammed.
Many people can't get over the mental barrier that they have lost everything. The only thing they have to live for is the hope that their money might come back, and we have seen people wait for years even after the scam artist has completely vanished and they don't even know who to call to check on their investment. But they still sit around, thinking that someday, somehow, a check for millions will somehow miraculously appear in their mailbox.
Many people are embarrassed because they have been scammed. They've told their family and friends about this great investment, and simply can't face them to say that they did something stupid.
Many people are culpable because they have also gotten their family and friends to invest in these programs, and even if the scam artist can't be found, they will go to jail for aiding and abetting the felony sale of securities without a license, embezzlement, etc.
Well, all you folks who fall into these categories NEED TO WAKE UP AND SMELL THE COFFEE. Your money is gone, vamoosed, and you will never, ever get it back. The least you can do is report your losses to the police and to the FBI so that at least they can stop the scam artist before they hurt someone else.
STUPID ARGUMENTS
About twice a month, we get actually get calls from the scam artists themselves, posing from everything from an interested investor to an attorney acting on behalf of one of the roll programs. These idiots offer all sorts of B.S., arguing that their program is somehow "different" or that they have "guaranteed returns" or other such nonsense. Notably, they almost all hang up when we suggest that if their program is so good, that they should take it to the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission and register it!
Again, we have seen literally hundreds of these programs over the last several years but we have YET to see even a single legitimate one. Not one!
THEY DO NOT EXIST
Every couple of weeks, some sucker who is about to be scammed calls us and says essentially "I've read your website but isn't it possible that some of these might be for real?"
No! Hell No!
None of these are for real, period. This scam has been going on for years, and to date NO program has been legitimate. If you can't find the proposed program investment in either the Wall Street Journal or the London Financial Times, and if it has not been registered with your State Securities Commissioner, then it is a scam. Any and all reasons why it is not so listed are the purest of lies.
During the course of the last several years, we have seen hundreds of these programs, but we have yet to see a real one! If there is a real one out there, we'd like to know because it would be the first. We're not holding our breath, however.
[Please do not send us information to evaluate these programs, unless you also send us the U.S. address of the promoter so that we can forward this information to law enforcement for them to check against their records.]
© 2002-2005 by Financial & Tax Fraud Associates, Inc.. All rights reserved. No portion of this website may be reprinted in whole or in part without the express, written permission of Financial & Tax Fraud Associates, Inc. This site is http://www.quatloos.com. Legal issues should be faxed to (877) 698-0678. Our attorneys are Grobaty & Pitet LLP (http://grobatypitet.com) and Riser Adkisson LLP (http://risad.com).
Office Supplies Frauds & Scams
Material provided with the permission of Les Henderson & crimes-of-persuasion.com
Highly Recommended!
Les Henderson's Crimes of Persuasion
crimes-of-persuasion.com
A comprehensive look at schemes, scams & frauds
Book available from Amazon and other retailers
ISBN 0-9687133-0-0
Bogus Invoices / Office Supplies
Businesses, churches, and fraternal and charitable organizations are being bilked out of millions of dollars by bogus office supply firms. You can protect yourself by learning to recognize the scams and understanding your rights.
The typical office supply scam involves goods or services that you routinely order: copier paper, toner and maintenance supplies, equipment maintenance contracts, or classified advertising. When fraudulent telemarketers call, they often lie to get you to pay for items you didn't order, or to get you to pay more than you agreed to.
They take advantage of holes in your organization's purchasing procedures or of unsuspecting employees who may not be aware of office practices. What's worse, the office supplies peddled by these bogus firms are often overpriced and of poor quality and the services are usually worthless.
Phony-invoice Scams
Schemers know that a business sometimes makes mistakes or can be careless in its accounting, so they prey on these weaknesses. Lifting names from mailing lists, business registers, the Yellow Pages or published advertisements, swindlers send "pro-forma" invoices for supplies and services. However, the invoice may be a solicitation in disguise and in very fine print contain the following disclaimer:
"This is a solicitation. You are under no obligation to pay unless you accept this offer."
Although the law states that it is illegal to send such a solicitation without the disclaimer being conspicuous and in large print, there are those who flout the regulations and send disguised solicitations.
Authorized Buyer
One goal of the phony-invoice scam is to get the name of an employee before your organization is shipped and billed for unordered goods or services. They use various ploys to do so such as asking for help completing an order, claiming that "the accounting department lost the name of the person we should send these supplies to," or they may ask for the name of the person in charge of your advertising or purchasing.
The phony invoice, which includes the employee's name as the "authorized" buyer, arrives a week or so after, for two reasons.
First, the inflated price, as much as ten times what you'd pay for the same goods from a legitimate supplier, is less obvious if the invoice arrives after the merchandise has been received and stocked.
Second, the chances are good that you've used the merchandise before the invoice arrives. Many organizations mistakenly believe that they must return unordered merchandise or pay for unordered merchandise before they've used it.
The Pretender Scam
In the pretender scam, the caller may pretend to be your regular or previous supplier, a replacement, or an "authorized" supplier. By convincing you that the goods or services and prices offered are the same as before, the caller hopes you won't bring up prices, quantities, and brands. Even if you do, the seller may try to brush you off by saying, "We've supplied you in the past, but it's been a while," or "The price is the same as last time."
If you insist on a price quote, the seller may give a price that sounds reasonable for one carton but is actually for a single unit, such as "$19.95 in a carton of 10," meaning the carton price is 10 times $19.95, or $199.50.
They can misrepresent the quality, quantity, type, price, or brand name. For example, the toner for your Xerox copier may not be Xerox brand toner. Some scam artists try to duplicate brand name packaging; others sell half a carton of merchandise at the full-carton price.
In another twist, the caller uses high-pressure tactics to rush your purchase decision and dodge questions about price, quantity and brand names. The seller may falsely claim that prices are going up soon, someone was forced out of business, a warehouse is overstocked, or a limited inventory of government surplus is available. Or that a computer glitch delayed notification of a price increase, but, as a courtesy, an order has been reserved for you at the "regular" or "old" price.
He may misrepresent the purpose of the call, saying that he's calling to send you a promotional item such as a cordless screwdriver, free samples, or a catalogue so you'll "think of him next time you order."
If you send back the single toner cartridge they sent uninvited, they may call up and say you kept one of the two they sent, so pay up.
Or the seller may claim that he's conducting a survey of office equipment or updating company records, leading you to believe that he's the regular or previous supplier. Before hanging up, the caller may mention, in passing, actual merchandise. "I'll send that screwdriver to you right away … and while I'm at it, I'll throw in a few deodorant blocks." Soon, a shipment arrives, matching your equipment supplies, followed by a bill.
The Gift-Horse Scam
The gift-horse scam tries to create mistrust within an organization. The scheme starts when the caller tricks an employee into accepting a gift or a free promotional item, with a passing reference to merchandise or services. You then receive overpriced, unordered merchandise, followed by an invoice with the employee's name.
When the organization questions the employee, the fraudulent seller is betting that the employee will be nervous about the gift when he denies placing the order. The hope is that the organization will doubt the employee. When this scheme works, the organization believes that the employee blundered into ordering something that must be paid for.
They may also target a person with the authority to sign cheques, then work on their fear of job loss, while sending escalating and persistent invoicing, despite continued "last one" promises. They may even threaten to notify higher-ups of the personal gifts if the false bills are not paid.
Though they rarely blackmail people in this fashion, one scammer's efforts eventually had several bookkeepers charged with embezzlement with the continued use of the phrase "You still have a balance due on your account!"
________________________________________
24 Hour Scamming
One group was charged for sending invoices to organizations, including churches and non-profit organizations, for unordered computer repair service contracts. Their mailings indicated that they were "renewals" or "upgrades of service" to previous contracts, or warned that an account was "past due." Their solicitations also provided an 800 number for consumers to call for "unlimited maintenance and repair services" including assistance by telephone. The FTC alleged that the defendants rarely, if ever, provided the promised services to consumers.
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Paper Pirates and Toner Phoners
One "toner bandit" scheme defrauded numerous medical and dental providers who were induced to pay false and fictitious invoices for high priced, unordered and undelivered copy machine toner.
Supply Distribution Centre set up customer service telephones and mail boxes through which to operate the false billing scheme. Fictitious invoices charging $274.95 or $283.92 for one carton of unordered copy machine toner were printed and mailed out to various businesses and institutions. About $14,000 in victims' checks was deposited into their account while about $140,000 worth was cashed at a liquor store.
Victims who complained about the invoices to them or to consumer protection agencies had their invoices cancelled in an effort to reduce complaints and hide the scheme. No toner was ever shipped to victims who paid the initial invoices. Instead, they simply received another invoice billing them for another shipment of unordered toner.
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Willing To Clean You Out
Perpetrated through a company that used the names of Sharp Industries, Saturn Industries, Polaris Industries, Trans-America, and Chem. Tech, one telemarketing scheme defrauded thousands of victim companies including nursing homes, churches, hotels, schools, hospitals and other organizations nationwide out of over $12 million during a five-year period.
They caused the victim companies to pay exorbitant prices for maintenance supplies such as penetrating oil, silicone spray, trash bags, and other products they ordered. For example, a case of penetrating oil (12 cans per case) was commonly charged to the victims at approximately $420 for one case (12 cans - $35 per can), when the same product was purchased wholesale for approximately $30 ($2.50 per can).
In addition to charging grossly inflated prices to unsuspecting customers they would also send gifts or kickbacks to the home addresses of purchasing agents to induce them to pay the exorbitant prices charged on the sales invoices.
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We Have To Keep Moving
Complaints from a real estate firm, a trucking company, a hospital, a school district, and a non-profit agency describe phone calls from a young woman, claiming that her father is closing his office supply business in a nearby town and moving the business. She claims the supplies are offered "at cost" or "very cheap," and quotes specific prices.
The supplies are shipped, but the invoice amounts are higher than expected. Totals have been reported of $292 to $1,922. In some cases the original price quoted turned out to be "per item," rather than "per box" and did not reflect the price quoted over the telephone.
________________________________________
After the Invoice Arrives
Scam artists can spend significant time and energy on collection efforts. They will send as many invoices as it takes to get your money. Invoices often are stamped "Past Due." In extreme cases, they'll resort to real or bogus collection agencies and threats of legal action, preceded by dunning letters.
An organization that pays for unordered goods or services also may be targeted for additional scams or "reloaded." For example, the seller may send a second shipment of "back ordered" merchandise and another bill, or bills for service upgrades.
Additional invoices follow as long as you continue to pay. The con artist also may sell your organization's name to other scam operators, or convert to another bogus operation and target you with a new scheme.
The Brush-off
When organizations complain that they didn't order the merchandise or services or that the price is too high, the scam seller reacts in some predictable ways:
• Bullying. The seller argues with you if you express any uncertainty about whether the supplies or services were ever ordered: "They were ordered. We have a recording of Mr. Jones. If you don't pay, we can take you to court."
• Negotiating. Here, the seller agrees to accept a lower price. After all, the goods and services are so grossly overpriced that almost anything the seller gets is profit. If you complain about price, the seller may say, "You were charged what? They must not have given you the discount for...." The seller then tries to negotiate "a better deal." Sometimes, the seller appeals for sympathy: "We really need the business. I'll let you have it for...."
• Charging for returned merchandise. The seller claims you can return merchandise if you pay a "restocking fee." In fact, the fee is often more than the goods are worth. Similarly, the seller may try to get you to pay shipping charges to return the items.
________________________________________
How To Avoid Supply Scams
You can protect your organization from paying for unordered goods and services. Here's how:
1. Know your rights. If you receive supplies or bills for services you didn't order, don't pay, and don't return the unordered merchandise. You may treat unordered merchandise as a gift.
By law, it's illegal for a seller to send you bills or dunning notices for unordered merchandise, or ask you to return it, even if the seller offers to pay for shipping.
Further, if the seller sends you items that differ from your order, you may treat the substitutions as unordered merchandise. Unordered services are treated the same way. However, first consider the possibility that the seller made an honest mistake.
2. Assign designated buyers and documents your purchases. For each order, the designated employee should issue a purchase order, electronic or written, to the supplier with an authorized signature and a purchase order number.
The order form should instruct the supplier to note the purchase order number on the invoice and bill of lading. The buyer should send a copy of every purchase order to your accounts payable department. Keep blank order forms secure.
3. Check your documentation before paying bills. When merchandise arrives, the receiving employee should verify that it matches the shipper's bill of lading, paying special attention to brands and quantity, and your purchase order. Refuse merchandise that doesn't. If everything's in order, the employee should send a copy of the bill of lading to your accounts payable department.
Bills for services should be reconciled the same way. A supplier should not be paid unless the invoice has the correct purchase order number and the information on the invoice, the purchase order and the bill of lading match.
4. Train your staff. Train everyone in how to respond to telemarketers. Advise employees who are not authorized to order supplies and services to say, "I'm not authorized to place orders. If you want to sell us something, you must speak to that person and get a purchase order."
Buy from people you know and trust. Authorized employees should be sceptical of "cold" or unsolicited calls and feel comfortable saying no to high-pressure sales tactics. Legitimate companies don't pressure you to make a snap decision. Finally, consider asking new suppliers to send a catalogue first.
________________________________________
Ten Million Reasons Not To Realize
Edward Tunick, who faces seven to 10 years in prison for his January conviction on nine counts of mail fraud in federal court, was involved in telemarketing maintenance supplies for 12 years. By his own admission, his companies, which ran under multiple names, tallied gross receipts of more than $10 million in that period.
Suggesting that it took a jury trial to make him realize the error of his ways, Tunick said he did not realize until after his conviction that what he was doing was against the law.
He and his employees would call businesses offering products -- in his case, light bulbs and janitorial supplies, while avoiding the subject of price during their calls. Posing as long time suppliers to the victim companies and often offering gifts to employees to help persuade them to place an order, Tunick then would send the products to one address and the invoice, with marked-up prices, to another.
The scam works because large companies often fail to question invoices below a certain dollar value, usually $500. Fraudulent telemarketers know this so they keep sending bills for $200 or $300.
________________________________________
Office Supply Outrage
27 Apr 2001
Thank you for having this web site!
I just got hit with this again today, and it's prompted me to write, warning everyone about this telemarketing scam.
Several years ago, I was working as an office manager for an architectural firm. One day I received a phone call from a guy who asked me if I could confirm the model number of the copier in my office. He acted very casual, as if he had been dealing with our company for years. Not knowing any better, I gave him the information.
Shortly thereafter, boxes upon boxes of copier toner arrived at my office. I had never authorized the purchase, but they had my name, and sent the product anyway. The boxes weren't marked distinctively, so I opened them to see what was inside. Mistake. As soon as you open a box, you cannot refuse it to the shipper. So I was stuck with a bunch of high-priced toner that I didn't want or need.
Let anyone who answers the phone for your company know about this telemarketing scam. There are two approaches the scum-suckers usually take:
1. A person will call and say something like, "Hi. This is Brian from the office centre. Could you confirm the model number of your copier for me?
2. A person will call and say something like, "Hi. This is Jen from your supply centre. I wanted to let you know that we just got a major price hike on your copier toner. But since you're such a good customer of ours, I'll make sure you still get it at the old price. Do you still have the Canon M217 (they'll just make up a copier model)?
As soon as you reply with, "What is the name of the company you are calling from?" or "What information do you have on our copier?" or anything that requests information of them, they will hang up on you.
I've tried to bust these people, but have not yet been successful. I've tried to do a "*69" (call back) on the phone, but they always have their number blocked. I've also checked my caller ID, but again, the number is always blocked.
When I got the packages that time, I tried tracing the return address - it was a fake address. They must have gone into a postage service centre, used cash to pay for the shipping, and given a false return address. And what about the invoice? A P.O. box.
Not sure what would have happened if I hadn't paid the bill, but I DID give them my name and I DID give them my copier model number. They could have argued that it was an authorized sale.
My point is, don't get yourself into this situation. If anyone calls you asking you for ANY information - personal, business or otherwise - DO NOT GIVE IT TO THEM! Ask for them to put their request in writing. If they're legit, they'll do it.
Please forward this to anyone who works in an office. I think this is important and could save people a lot of money and hassle (and possibly save someone their job!).
Let's beat these scumbags at their own game!
Melissa Hertzler
________________________________________
No Fixed Address
Vermont Attorney General William H. Sorrell announced that his office has settled a consumer fraud lawsuit against Merchant Product Services (MPS)(3522318 Canada, Inc.), a telemarketing company based in Montreal, Quebec run by its president and director, Misha Artzy.
MPS, a seller of paper and ribbon for credit and debit card machines, had solicited orders by telephone from businesses all over the country, using the Vermont address of a mail handling facility in the town of Derby.
The Attorney General alleged that the defendants violated the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act by:
• Failing to disclose important terms of MPS' offer, namely, the price and quantity of the supplies that the defendants wished to sell.
• Failing to provide required disclosures of customers' three-day right to cancel their purchase over the telephone.
• Charging unconscionably high prices for their products-between 5.4 and 11.0 times the prices of comparable products sold by others.
• Misrepresenting that MPS was affiliated with the manufacturer of credit/debit card machines or served such machines, rather than that it was actually a seller of machine supplies.
• Misrepresenting the purpose of the defendants' telemarketing sales calls by creating the impression that their calls were intended to check on how potential customers' credit and debit card machines were working.
Although the defendants denied these allegations they agreed to a permanent ban on doing any business in or into Vermont, including using a Vermont address.
They are also required to pay $21,000 in full refunds to all of their Vermont customers; full refunds to all non-Vermont customers who have filed-or who may in the future file-a complaint with the State; $60,000 in civil penalties to the State; and $12,500 to reimburse the State for its fees in litigating the case-for a total of at least $93,500.
For further information on the settlement, businesses can contact the Attorney General's Consumer Assistance Program at 1-800-649-2424. October 9, 2001
________________________________________
Free Can Be Expensive
02/02 - James W. MacDonald pleaded guilty to mail and a wire fraud conspiracy involving a $6 million dollar fraudulent telemarketing company in Boca Raton and New Jersey and was sentenced to nearly 10 years in prison.
He told his telemarketers to offer businesses free samples of cleaning and lighting supplies then later billed the companies for the supplies at prices inflated up to 4,500 percent, according to the U.S. attorney's office.
While the companies operated from 1989 to 1994, MacDonald was arrested in 1999. Three others, Darren Sturtevant, Philip Lynch, and Steven Green also pleaded guilty to the scheme and are awaiting sentencing.
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11 December 1998
INSIDER TRADING
TIME TO DRAW BLOOD
New law must ensure that the crooks get out, or pay dearly
A shocking number of SA investors seem incapable of playing by the rules. And why not? While practices like insider trading remain uncurbed, there's money to be made through dishonesty. It's fairly simple to pick up some price-sensitive company news, check the information and buy the share. What's more, insider-trading laws seem lax, at best. No one has yet been convicted. In fact, no-one has ever been charged.
But there's good reason, leaving morality out of it, to enforce laws more strictly and make penalties more severe. Honest trading on the JSE needs to be upheld because it's the only way the local exchange will prosper in the long term. It makes straight financial sense.
It's all very well to restrict forward thinking to the next lucrative punt, but most local and international investors just aren't attracted by fraud.
Global portfolio managers don't like the lack of effective regulation against insider trading and similar practices on SA's markets. The country wants and needs their investment, but foreigners are not starved for choice. And our insider trading law is treated with contempt locally and offshore.
"Undoubtedly this is a factor deterring offshore investors," says JSE president, Russell Loubser.
Neither does this lack of control encourage local investors, who can now place funds in markets worldwide. For those not privy to the inside track on corporate wheeling and dealing, insider trading makes the JSE a risky and less desirable investment avenue. Worst of all, it perpetuates South Africa's image abroad as a haven for pirates and crooks.
And this doesn't apply only to the smallest of private shareholders. Larger institutional investors, too, are often unable to give attention to - or act on - market gossip. Overall, the majority loses out.
Take the notorious case of life assured Crusader Life. Odd trading patterns around the time of its 1993 liquidation are still under investigation by the Office for Serious Economic Offences (Oseo). It's one of only two cases that now face prosecution - two others were discarded recently by the attorney general - though there are more in the pipeline.
And a new Insider Trading Bill is on its way to becoming law. It will hand authority for insider trading regulation from the Securities Regulatory Panel (SRP) to the more powerful and better-funded Financial Services Board (FSB).
Insider trading became an issue when Crusader issued a healthy and encouraging interim report, yet had a R77m deficit by year-end. In the interim, Crusader directors and brothers Bob and Don Rowland had offloaded their family trust shares near the top of the market. A few months later, Crusader's controlling shareholders admitted the shares were almost worthless.
A look at Crusader's share graph is all it takes to see that shareholders, a mixture of individuals and institutions, had good reason to be unhappy. The share price plummet after Crusader's predicament was revealed was dramatic - from 375c in February to 135c only two months later.
No wonder JSE shareholders are irate that the case has taken so long to finalise. But it would be unfair to accuse either the SRP or Oseo of procrastination. The delay is caused in part by problematic legislation.
So far, insiders trading laws and regulators have been hopelessly ineffectual. Current legislation - Section 440(f) of the 1973 Companies Act - has the right aims but three important problems: the legislation deals only with shares and not with other financial instruments; it requires almost unrealistic proof that traders bought or sold shares on inside information; and the imprecision of some definitions makes them difficult to apply.
True, says SRP executive director Richard Connellan bitterly. "I admit I am as biased as hell. We haven't convicted anyone but the law made it almost impossible. We will gladly co-operate with the FSB. But I am disappointed we didn't retain the insider trading regulatory function; the changes we initiated are imminent and only now is effective action possible."
In the past, says Connellan, the SRP could frequently prove the trader had the knowledge, and that he dealt in the shares. "But we had to prove indisputably that he dealt on the basis of the knowledge. That was one difficult part. The other stumbling block was the attorney general's office. He never wanted to take on the cases. Our files went to the bottom of the pile and were forgotten."
Loubser admits regulators had to cope with toothless laws and too few staff. Whatever the reason, enforcement has been patently ineffective. "Why should I give a stuff about new legislation?" asks a broker understandably not wishing to be named. "Current law is a joke. No-one will take it seriously until there's been one successful prosecution."
The examples are numerous. What has happened to the investigation of Automakers, the Sanlam-controlled car manufacturer that had a disastrous and short-lived listing in 1996 and 1997? It seems there were market players who knew something about Automakers' fate before the rest of us learnt of it.
By the time Automakers had announced its delisting in early 1997, the share price had started to rocket. Trading volumes, having dwindled in late 1996, suddenly jumped.
Still, it's not always easy to prove insider trading played a part in unusual share price movement. Hoechst financial director Johan Kok agrees that the group's share movements were unusual before its German holding company announced this year its intention to buy out minority shareholders and delist the SA company.
But, he says, the combination of a cautionary that had been announced in March and an article in the FM speculating on Hoechst's likely delisting and the sale of a local division were the main causes of the counter's rise. "Some analysts started putting two and two together, and speculated that Hoechst would be delisted," he says. "There was a hell of a lot of speculation in the market."
He may well be right - at least partly. But it's well known that merger and acquisition activity is a popular time for unusual trading patterns on the JSE. FSB staff at the SRP during the transition of authority is already working on recent suspicious cases. They are, of course, limited in their work by current legislation.
Still, only the naive would imagine that new legislation will result in immediate convictions. But market players not yet aware of the potential of new law had better wake up. Things are about to change.
"Any broker who imagines that life will continue as normal after the new law is implemented will be sorely tested," says JSE legal counsel Nicky Newton-King, who took part in drawing up the new law.
The Insider Trading Bill is much stricter than current legislation. Probably the most significant change - and the most controversial - is that the FSB can apply civil rather than criminal procedures to enforce the legislation.
In short, this makes it more likely that the court will be able to convict and penalise wrongdoers than the current criminal remedy accepted by the courts for insider trading. Civil penalties are a maximum of triple the insider trading profit. Powers of investigation are boosted. And, says FSB deputy head Rob Barrow, "through powers of subpoena we will be able to identify the beneficiaries of nominee accounts."
With these new laws, it will also make a difference that enforcement shifts from the much-maligned SRP to the FSB. It has more staff, better technology and more funds. The new law allows the FSB better communication than previously with the JSE's surveillance team.
Contrarians regularly come up with arguments defending the theory of inside information. Allowing news to spread uncurbed, they say, is in the best interests of investors who are able to gain swift access to company information. The spread of news along market networks doesn't take long. This increases market efficiency. Don't legislate; in fact, encourage it.
In practice, theories mean little to investors who realise they are losing out because of the inside knowledge of others. The effects of insider trading - particularly for the losers - sound good in theory only. Pro-insider traders are willing to acknowledge that "outsiders" lose out. That's a pity, they agree. But inevitable, and good for the JSE in the long run.
Unfortunately, this argument misses the point. Investors have a choice. Markets in the most developed countries legislate severely against insider trading. The result is simple: it happens much less than in SA.
Even then, the latest changes to the law, however laudable, aren't sufficient. Regulators of SA markets still face tremendous difficulties. Take the unnecessary complication of having two ministries responsible for financial regulation, for example. Trade & Industry controls the Companies Act, while Finance is responsible for other market legislation.
To eliminate the gaps in the system, this must urgently be simplified. Finance, now responsible for the bulk of financial market regulation and administration, seems the obvious choice.
For whatever reason - the allegations are many - those few cases referred to attorneys-general's offices don't seem to go much further than that. This is extremely frustrating to market regulators who argue that only watertight cases are submitted. Problems may include lack of interest from attorneys-general or insufficient evidence for prosecutions.
Whatever the case, communication and working structures between offices of attorneys-general and the FSB must still be improved.
Jurisdiction over the Internet, a useful site for insider traders, needs to be considered in legislation.
The shield of anonymity given to traders who deal through nominee companies must also be removed. That kind of protection complicates detection of trading fraud. An upcoming amendment to the Companies Act reduces the legal holdings of nominees in any company to 5%. Not bad. But it is still 5% too far. Where, when they are needed, are the DTIs transforming teeth?
On a similar theme, the FSB must communicate with investors. Regular bulletins or published announcements should detail the number of cases under investigation and progress in bringing offenders to book. Until they are proven guilty, no names need be mentioned. Communication will, however, act as a warning of the FSB's presence.
Take note: there will be no possibility of anonymity for convicted offenders. "That's one of my contributions," says Barrow with some satisfaction.
By: Michelle Joubert
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Volume TWO Chapter SIX
Special Investigation into Project Coast
SOUTH AFRICA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMME
n INTRODUCTION
1 The Commission's hearings into South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare programme (the CBW programme, also known as Project Coast) during the 1980s and early 1990s were held in Cape Town in June and July 1998. The hearings focused on the apparently offensive (as opposed to defensive) aspects of the programme. The image of white-coated scientists, professors, doctors, dentists, veterinarians, laboratories, universities and front companies, propping up apartheid with the support of an extensive international network, was a particularly cynical and chilling one. Here was evidence of science being subverted to cause disease and undermine the health of communities. Cholera, botulism, anthrax, chemical poisoning and the large-scale manufacture of drugs of abuse, allegedly for purposes of crowd control, were amongst the projects of the programme. Moreover, chemicals, poisons and lethal micro-organisms were produced for use against individuals, and ‘applicators’ (murder weapons) developed for their administration.
2 The CBW programme,
which was developed and supported by scientists, health professionals, research laboratories and front companies, fell under the nominal control of the surgeon-general of the armed forces. Ostensibly designed and conducted to support a ‘defensive capability’ in response to perceived external threats and international developments, the CBW programme displayed numerous bizarre aberrations of policy, management and intent. Overall approval and budget control lay with a central management committee which included the chief of staff of the defence force, the chief of staff of intelligence, the surgeon general as project manager and the project leader, Dr Wouter Basson. It became clear at the hearing that the overall command by the surgeon general and his colleagues on the co-ordinating committee was either ignored, or alternatively that they themselves were complicit in the programme's criminal aberrations.
3 One of the curious aspects of the CBW programme was the high level of respect it enjoyed with the military and the government of the day. The facts, as they emerged in the Commission's hearings, show that this respect was misplaced. The scientific research undertaken by the project was pedestrian, misdirected, ineffectual and unproductive. It was also exorbitantly expensive, costing the nation tens if not hundreds of millions of rands. Moreover, the evidence that emerged at the Commission's hearings demonstrates that it resulted in the substantial self-enrichment of several of the individuals involved.
4 The investigation began with a single amnesty application, a small number of confiscated technical documents relating to the programme and documentation from the Commission’s Research Department. It expanded into a comprehensive exposé, based on more than 150 documents, affidavits, amnesty applications and interviews. The results provide a basis for further investigation of the individuals involved and their apparently unprofessional and criminal activities. They also ensure that such aberrations in national policy and individual behaviour are chronicled and prevented from happening again. In this regard, there may also be lessons for the international community.
n METHODOLOGY
5 The Commission's exploration of the South African Defence Force (SADF) chemical and biological warfare programme began in 1996 with a top secret briefing by Mr Mike Kennedy of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the surgeon general, Dr D.P.Knobel, to a select group of Commission officials who had received security clearance from the NIA. The gist of the briefing was that although South Africa had had a CBW capability in the past, it had been defensive in nature and had subsequently been dismantled.
6 After this briefing, the Research Department began to look at the background to the programme and its implications, relying on the information that was available. This included press clippings, a few intelligence reports and some information gathered by Mr Claus De Jonge who was asked to look at the programme in Europe. The Research Department then drew up a list of anti-apartheid activists who had been the target of poisonings or suspected poisonings (for example, the attempted assassination of the Reverend Frank Chikane in 1989). This led the Commission to conclude that toxins may have been used by the security forces in their war against the 'total onslaught', a conclusion later corroborated by former operatives of the SADF.
7 The arrest of Dr Basson and the seizure of four trunks containing documents related to Project Coast in January 1997 provided the Commission with proof that there was more to the programme than had initially met the eye. The Commission was one of four interested groups with access to the trunks, the other three being the Office for Serious Economic Offences, the Gauteng Attorney-General's Special Investigation Team and the NIA. An agreement was struck between the parties that the Commission would have unhindered access to the information in the trunks.
8 In 1997, the Commission decided to call the project officer, Dr Basson, for a section 29 in camera hearing, in an attempt to glean more information about the programme and its relation to human rights abuses. Before the subpoena could be enforced, the Attorney General and the NIA approached the Commission. The Commission was persuaded that enforcing the subpoena could be detrimental to the case that the Attorney General was building against Dr Basson, and that it could jeopardise state security. The Commission was requested to hold a meeting with the Deputy President, which would be organised by the NIA, to discuss these matters. The Commission agreed and Dr Basson was informed that he would not be required to appear before an investigative hearing at that stage.
9 A series of meetings between the Commission and the NIA took place but no meeting with the Deputy President was forthcoming. The Commission issued a second subpoena to Dr Basson in February 1997. Again, the NIA intervened and the Commission agreed not to enforce the subpoena until it had consulted with the necessary parties.
10 By August 1997, two related amnesty applications had been identified. The Commission could no longer postpone its investigation into the CBW programme. It had become clear that investigating only the two amnesty applications and not the operations of the programme in general would represent a neglect of the Commission's duty to uncover the truth.
11 It was therefore agreed that an in-depth investigation would be conducted, starting in February 1998. At that stage there were only four months remaining before the Commission would have to conclude all its investigative work.
12 Discussions with the office of the Attorney General again revealed a concern that the Commission's investigation would have a negative impact on its prosecution of Dr Basson. It was clear that an overlap between the two investigations could not be avoided. The group of scientists with information about the programme was small and the amount of information available consequently limited. Although the Commission assured the Attorney General on a number of occasions that it did not intend to damage his case in any way, progress was slow and at no stage was information shared between the two offices. The NIA continued to share the concerns of the Attorney General and had additional concerns that it believed to be even more serious. This made for a slow and painful beginning to the investigation, requiring more negotiation than investigation.
13 The Office for Serious Economic Offences was, however, very helpful. Although it expressed doubts about the Commission's ability to complete an investigation of such magnitude in so short a period of time, it provided enough information and assistance to guide the Commission in the right direction. Access to documents from the trunks also proved vital to the Commission's case.
14 The first real investigative steps involved setting up a number interviews with a wide range of people. In order to make a start, a core group of important individuals was identified. During a series of debriefings with this group and an examination of the vast and confusing evidence that was being gathered, the true complexity of the programme began to emerge. It was soon realised that the limited scientific knowledge available in the Commission was simply not sufficient to help it understand the implications of the research documents from Roodeplaat Research Laboratories and Delta G Scientific. It also became clear that the focus of the investigations would have to be restricted considerably, since time was at a premium and the subject matter was vast.
15 Professor Peter Folb, head of the Pharmacology Department at the University of Cape Town, was approached and agreed to provide the Commission with assistance. With his expert help, the Commission was able to decipher the relevant documents and begin to develop a complete picture of the bizarre type of science that was conducted by these military front companies.
16 A computer database of all documents relevant to the investigation was developed and the Commission continued to conduct interviews with scientists and others involved in the programme. It was clear that the hearing (planned for 8 to 12 June 1998) would not be able to touch on all aspects of the investigation. It was decided, therefore, in discussion with the legal officer of the Commission and the commissioners, that the focus of the hearing should be further limited. The potential witness list was also re-examined and a final, shortened list decided upon.
17 Two weeks before the hearing was due to take place, government, in the person of the Deputy Minister of Defence, requested a meeting with the Commission to discuss the sensitivity of the hearing. A series of meetings with high level government representatives, including the offices of the President, the Deputy President, the Minister of Defence, the NIA and the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ensued. It became clear that there were two reasons for the government’s concern about a public hearing. First, that it could violate international obligations in relation to the international proliferation of chemical and biological weapons; and second, that it could jeopardise international relations with countries which may have assisted the programme but with whom South Africa continues to have diplomatic relations. This culminated in a representation by government that the hearing be held in camera, a suggestion that was declined. However, provision was made for the presence of a legal representative on behalf of government to ensure that no information was released that could lead to proliferation.
n RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION
Individual poisonings
18 The discovery of a document which has become known as the ‘Verkope lys’ (sales list) and a list of SADF sponsored (‘hard’) projects conducted at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories provided the Commission with a clear indication that there was an intent to poison individuals, and that the front company, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, was involved in the development of the toxins used for this purpose. Dr André Immelman, head researcher on SADF projects at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, authored the list, found amongst the documents seized at the time of Dr Basson’s arrest. Dr Immelman provided the Commission with an affidavit that confirms that he authored the list at a time when he had been required, at Dr Basson's request, to provide a group of individuals with the toxins. The items on the list include anthrax in cigarettes, botulinum in milk and paraoxon in whiskey — in the Commission’s view clearly murder weapons. This was, indeed, conceded by witnesses at the hearing and Dr Knobel went so far as to say that, in his view, such a list could not form part of a legitimate defensive programme. The inclusion of a baboon foetus on the list, dated late July 1989 (just prior to such a foetus being found in the garden of Archbishop Tutu's house), as well as a reference to chemical and biological operatives, indicated that the items may well have found their way, directly or indirectly, into the hands of operatives of the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB).
19 Discussions with members of the CCB indicated that operatives were not necessarily aware of the existence of a CBW programme. They were, however, aware of the capacity of the SADF doctors to provide them with toxins. A member of the Directorate of Covert Collection who explained to investigators that there was an understanding in their unit that they could get toxins from Dr Basson corroborated this.
Street drugs
20 Documents seized at the time of Dr Basson's arrest indicated that the front company, Delta G Scientific, was involved in the manufacture of significant quantities of methaqualone (mandrax) and ecstasy, and was also involved in researching the possibility of using street drugs for crowd control purposes. This was corroborated at the hearing.
21 It was also established that approximately 1 000kg of ecstasy was manufactured in 1992 and was, in all likelihood, encapsulated by Medchem Pharmaceuticals, a subsidiary of the holding company Medchem Consolidated Investments, under which Delta G Scientific also fell. The production manager at Delta G Scientific informed investigators that he had been approached in 1988 by the managing director of the company, Dr Philip Mijburgh, and asked to produce 1 000kg of methaqualone. It is not certain whether this was also encapsulated, but it seems likely. The explanation given by witnesses was that the intention was to use it for crowd control purposes. General Lothar Neethling told the Commission during the hearing that, on three occasions, he had been requested to provide Dr Basson with mandrax tablets confiscated by the South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB). He claimed that he had given Dr Basson approximately 200 000 tablets in total as well as quantities of LSD and dagga, on the understanding that they would be investigated to determine whether they would be appropriate crowd control weapons. None of the witnesses could provide the Commission with any information about tests that had been conducted in this regard and at least one witness stated that these drugs would not be suitable for such a purpose.
22 In August 1988, Delta G Scientific began producing 1 000kg of methaqualone. From the documentation provided by DrKnobel, it seems that tests were carried out on methaqualone as an incapacitate in 1988, and that it was established that it was not effective since it did not take effect immediately. As a result, work on methaqualone stopped at the end of 1988 but work on methaqualone analogues continued. What happened to the 1 000 kg of methaqualone has still not been established. Moreover, at the end of 1991, the Co-ordinating Management Committee of Project Coast saw fit to send Dr Basson to Croatia to close a deal with renegade Croatians (including high-ranking government officials) for the purchase of 500kg of methaqualone, which was brought back to South Africa.
23 A year later, this was allegedly destroyed after an order that work on all incapacitants should cease. The deal in Croatia was in itself extremely questionable, leading to a loss of millions of rands. Dr Basson intercepted Vatican bearer bonds to the value of $40 million that had been intended for the purchase of weapons by the Croatian government, leading to his arrest in Switzerland. Why the military was importing such large quantities of methaqualone at such high cost at this late stage of negotiations is not clear and was not adequately answered by Dr Knobel or Dr Basson. The documents also cast doubt on whether these substances were in fact destroyed on 27 January 1993, as alleged.
24 Investigations could not trace the drugs produced at Delta G directly to the street. However, Dr Basson was arrested with quantities of ecstasy and mandrax tablets in his possession, and the Steyn report indicates that Dr Basson allegedly offered an operative mandrax tablets in return for an operation. The Commission has a strong suspicion that drugs obtained during the course of this programme may well have found their way onto the streets.
Mozambican incident
25 In January 1992, FRELIMO troops conducted an operation near the South African border. During the course of the operation, they were allegedly exposed to what was thought to have been a chemical agent. Some of the soldiers died during the incident and others required hospitalisation.
26 A submission by General Pierre Steyn stated that South Africans launched an attack from Komatipoort as a training exercise. Investigators were unable to determine the accuracy of this information, as use of the Komatipoort airstrip is not regulated.
27 After the incident, a series of investigations were conducted by scientific teams from South Africa, Mozambique, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The reports were inconclusive. The only report that expressed a belief that the troops had been exposed to a chemical agent was that of the British scientist. A United Nations investigation was launched and was also unable to come to any firm conclusions.
28 Dr Brian Davy, who had been the head of the South African investigating team, spoke to Professor Peter Folb during the course of the Commission investigation and was unable to provide any further information. Attempts to meet with the British scientist failed. Attempts were also made to access the medical records of the soldiers involved. However, the Mozambican authorities failed to respond to Commission's requests for information. Investigators met with Dr Staub, a member of both the Swiss and the United Nations investigating team. He told them that he believed that the troops had suffered dehydration and had not been the victims of a chemical attack. This explanation struck the Commission's investigation unit as unlikely.
29 Investigators also met with Dr Vernon Joynt of Mechem, which could have manufactured the carrier for such a weapon. This interview did not provide any new information of significance.
30 Unfortunately, the matter remains unresolved.
International links and support
31 Documents in the Commission's possession indicate that Dr Basson travelled extensively to collect information during the initial phase of the CBW programme. He visited Taiwan where he was shown their CBW facilities and provided with significant information, and also attended a conference at San Antonio in the United States in the early 1980s. Documents indicate that, during the apartheid years, members of the SADF visited Israel and West Germany to share information about CBW matters and there was clearly a link with Belgian nationals and companies. Other documents reveal links between the surgeon general and Americans who were part of the United States CBW programme, and demonstrate their willingness to assist the South Africans.
32 Dr Basson and other members of the programme travelled extensively. Their links with sanctions busters and other people prepared to assist the South African CBW programme, both officially and unofficially, cannot be doubted. Dr Basson's trips to Croatia during the 1992/3 periods indicate that he had a number of contacts throughout the world who could provide assistance in one way or another.
33 By the end of 1993, the United States and British governments approached the South African government to express concern about the programme. The motives for the meetings between these two governments and the South Africans are unclear. At the hearing, both Dr Basson and Dr Knobel alleged that the British and Americans had informed them that they did not want the programme to fall into the hands of the ANC government after the election in April 1994. Dr Basson visited the US in 1981 and Dr Knobel had contact with scientists who were part of the American CBW programme much later; the existence of a South African programme was no secret to the Americans or the British. A further indication of such a relationship is a visit by Dr Brian Davey, a medical doctor and former member of the South African Medical Services (SAMS), to Porten Down in 1992, after the alleged attack on Mozambican forces (see above).
34 The role of foreign governments in supporting the South African programme is not yet clear. It cannot however be doubted that, without some level of foreign assistance, this programme would not have been possible.
n FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT
35 There is evidence of large-scale fraud and mismanagement of funds of the CBW programme, which is the subject of an extensive investigation by the Office for Serious Economic Offences (OSEO). The Attorney General provided the Commission with an interim charge sheet that reveals an intention to charge Dr Basson with fraud amounting to R50 million. Because fraud and theft of funds do not form part of the Commission's mandate, and because this is the subject of an investigation by the OSEO, the Commission did not extensively investigate this aspect. It did, however, become clear in the course of our investigations and through evidence given at the hearing that the programme was fraught with financial irregularities.
n INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE CBW PROGRAMME
Military
36 A management committee (beheerkomitee) was established to oversee the management of the CBW programme. It included the chief of the SADF, chief of staff finances, head of counter-intelligence, chief of staff intelligence, the surgeon-general and the project officer (Dr Basson). The management committee had three working groups: a technical working group, a security group and a group responsible for administration and finances. According to documents provided by Dr Knobel (which include a number of minutes from the meetings of this committee), once the front companies were established and running, the committee met once a year to approve the project's budget and as needed in the case of emergencies.
37 The surgeon general acted as project leader, a role that is unclear at this stage. Dr Basson was project officer and apparently reported both to the surgeon general and the head of Special Forces, and variously to the Minister of Defence, chief of the SADF, Minister of Police, commissioner of police and the chief of staff intelligence.
38 Front companies were established to do the work of the programme, with the SADF as the main client. They were also provided with covert funding from the SAMS budget during the earlier period of the programme.
39 No one at the hearing was prepared to take direct responsibility for the programme and responsibility has been passed both up and down. It is the Commission's view that, while Dr Basson was clearly a central figure, several of the people involved in the beheerkomitee cannot deny responsibility. Unfortunately, the exact responsibility for the programme could not be determined.
n ANALYSIS
40 The CBW programme in the 1980s and early 1990s was ostensibly established for the purpose of providing the country with a defensive capability. By this it was understood that there should be the necessary expertise to understand and to be able to react to chemical and biological threats posed from outside the country's borders. South Africa should also have the capacity to launch retaliatory attacks in the event of CBW agents being used against South Africa's own forces.
41 It was explicitly and repeatedly stated that the intention was not, and never had been, to develop an offensive capacity. Such intent would have been evidenced by large-scale production at factory level, the manufacture of missiles capable of dispersing chemical and biological substances amongst enemy troops (‘weaponisation’) and the training of troops in their use. There would also have been at least limited evidence of the use of such agents in warfare.
42 The exception to this was the express intention of the military to develop crowd control agents. These included standard agents for the purposes of self-sufficiency and novel agents developed through the adaptation of chemicals already in existence. There is also invariably some overlap between defensive and offensive programmes. Although never explained in precise terms, this may be the reason for surplus production volumes.
43 In strict military terms, such a defensive programme would need to be managed in accordance with each of a number of criteria. These would include careful compliance with the criteria of defensive capability, sound and disciplined leadership, careful auditing of financial dealings, compliance with international conventions determining the conduct of such military business and reliable and comprehensive systems of accountability. The Commission's hearings showed that the programme failed to meet each and every one of these criteria. In fact, there was consistent evidence of serious departures from these standards.
44 Despite the fact that the South African CBW programme during the period under review has now been exposed as showing gross aberrations of intent, discipline, actions, command structures, financial dealings and professional relationships, it was highly regarded within the military, which considered it a successful programme. The military command maintained that cognoscenti in the international military community shared this opinion. One of the astonishing aspects that emerged in the hearings was that the professionalism, competence and mystique of the programme were stripped away by the evidence of the very people who participated in it. The hearings revealed a nepotistic, self-serving and self-enriching group of people, misled by those who had a technical grasp of what was happening. They conducted work they deemed to be scientific, but which was underpinned by ideas, suggestions and hypotheses that were bizarre and incompetent.
45 Dr Basson’s evidence was not fully tested at the hearings because of the legal objections he raised with regard to his forthcoming criminal trial. Initially, Dr Basson's legal representatives indicated that they wished to bring a legal challenge to prevent their client from testifying at the hearing. The panel presiding over the hearing ruled, however, that Dr Basson was compelled to testify. This decision was challenged in the Cape High Court. The court upheld the panel's ruling and ordered Dr Basson to testify before the Commission on 29 July 1998, a mere three days before the mandate to hold human rights violations hearings expired.
46 On 29 July 1998, Dr Basson appeared before the Commission without his Pretoria-based legal representatives and asked that the hearing be postponed until they were available. Ultimately, Dr Basson's evidence was only heard on 31 July. Much of the time was spent on legal argument, and the extent of questioning was curtailed.
47 Although Dr Basson gave evidence for almost twelve hours, the Commission would have preferred to have had an opportunity to question him more thoroughly. In the event, many questions were left unanswered.
48 Dr Immelman, who served as director of the scientific research programme at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories during its existence as a front company for the conduct of the CBW programme, submitted an affidavit. A thorough testing of his evidence must now await his cross-examination in court. It is clear from Dr Immelman's affidavit that he was directly responsible for the production of items on the ‘Verkope lys’; that he dealt directly with operatives, and that he is accountable for the scientific content of the Roodeplaat Research Laboratories programme in the years in which he held office — in the mid- and late 1980s and the early 1990s. In addition to the obvious issues of professional culpability, negligence and criminal intent that apply to others as well, it has to be said specifically of Dr Immelman that he allegedly had full knowledge of the activities at the laboratories that were under his control.
49 Inevitably, the CBW programme achieved little of value or of common good. Enveloped as it was by secrecy, threats and fear, opportunism, financial mismanagement, incompetence, self-aggrandisement, together with a breakdown in the normal methods of scientific discourse, the results were paltry. Tens, even hundreds, of millions of rands were squandered on ideas that had no scientific validity. At best, the programme succeeded in producing for manufacture analogues of CR and BZ incapacitants, and in making local arrangements for protective clothing for troops against mass chemical and biological attack. At worst, the programme had criminal intent.
n FINDINGS
The Commission finds that:
• Scientists were recruited to the CBW programme from universities and research institutions in South Africa because of their ‘patriotism’ and loyalty to the government of the day. They were lured by generous conditions of service, facilities, working arrangements and pay packages.
• Work was conducted on a ‘need to know’ basis, subverting the very purpose of science. The free discourse of information and ideas that characterises scientific endeavour was subverted. Moreover, those who were appointed were intimidated and threatened, even with their lives, if they stepped out of line.
• Overall understanding of the programme, and its co-ordination and direction, were vested in the hands of one person, Dr Basson, whose ability and (it is assumed) integrity were unquestioned both by those who served under him and by those to whom he had to report. It emerged in the hearings that the military command was dependent on Dr Basson for the conduct and command of the programme, even at a time when there were sufficient indications that Dr Basson might not be trustworthy and that there were serious aberrations in what was happening.
• The military command, and pre-eminently the surgeon general, Dr DP Knobel, were grossly negligent in approving programmes and allocating large sums of money for activities of which they had no understanding, and which they made no effort to understand.
• The CBW programme made the self-enrichment of individuals possible and opened the way for a cynical subversion of its ostensible aims in the production of murder weapons for use against individuals.
• A extremely complicated arrangement of front companies supported the programme, a part of whose intention was a plan for its own ultimate privatisation. This, it appears, was intended from the start.
• The development of the programme would not have been possible without some level of international co-operation and support.
The role of the management committee
• The CBW programme, and in particular its gross aberrations, would not have succeeded without the support, active and tacit, of the Co-ordinating Management Committee over the period 1988 to 1995.
• The Committee knew of the large-scale production of mandrax and ecstasy and their purported use, but did not seek to establish reasons for this. It approved of the idea and lent its support directly. The idea of using either mandrax or ecstasy for the purpose of crowd control contravenes international codes. In addition, there was no scientific basis for thinking that it would be an appropriate, safe or sensible form of crowd control.
• The Committee was aware of and authorised Basson's trips to Croatia, at great expense, to purchase 500kg of methaqualone as late as 1992, and assisted Basson when he was arrested in Switzerland in possession of fraudulent bearer bonds.
The surgeon general in particular:
• Knew of the production of murder weapons but refused to address the concerns that were raised with him, on the grounds that they did not fall under his authority. He was nevertheless fully aware that these activities happened in facilities under his direct control and were perpetrated by staff under his chain of command.
• Did not understand, by his own admission, the medical, chemical and technical aspects and implications of a programme that cost tens, if not hundreds of millions of rands.
• Made no effort to come to grips with these technical and medical issues, notwithstanding the fact that he was the highest-ranking medical professional in the military and that others in the military were wholly dependent on his judgement and discretion.
• advised the Minister of Defence, on 7 January 1993, that South Africa should conceal from the Chemical Weapons Convention that the country possessed NGT (a new generation of tear gas related closely to CR), recommending that South Africa should proceed with the research and development of NGT in a covert manner while at the same time concealing it.
• Approved the budget for projects (in some cases alone, and in others in con junction with his fellow officers on the management committee, with or without the full understanding of what he was doing) that had as their purpose the murder of individuals, and the undermining of the health, if not the elimination, of entire communities (for example, projects involving cholera, fertility drugs, botulinum, mandrax and ecstasy).
• Agreed to the destruction of documents describing the activities and the financial aspects of these programmes. Instead, he should have ensured that the details of the programme were recorded and accessible, while limiting their accessibility to authorised persons. This would have safeguarded the massive investment, both financial and in terms of scientific achievement, while, on the other hand, guarding against use of the information for purposes of proliferation or criminal activities.
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11 December 1998
INSIDER TRADING
TIME TO DRAW BLOOD
New law must ensure that the crooks get out, or pay dearly
A shocking number of SA investors seem incapable of playing by the rules. And why not? While practices like insider trading remain uncurbed, there's money to be made through dishonesty. It's fairly simple to pick up some price-sensitive company news, check the information and buy the share. What's more, insider-trading laws seem lax, at best. No one has yet been convicted. In fact, no-one has ever been charged.
But there's good reason, leaving morality out of it, to enforce laws more strictly and make penalties more severe. Honest trading on the JSE needs to be upheld because it's the only way the local exchange will prosper in the long term. It makes straight financial sense.
It's all very well to restrict forward thinking to the next lucrative punt, but most local and international investors just aren't attracted by fraud.
Global portfolio managers don't like the lack of effective regulation against insider trading and similar practices on SA's markets. The country wants and needs their investment, but foreigners are not starved for choice. And our insider trading law is treated with contempt locally and offshore.
"Undoubtedly this is a factor deterring offshore investors," says JSE president, Russell Loubser.
Neither does this lack of control encourage local investors, who can now place funds in markets worldwide. For those not privy to the inside track on corporate wheeling and dealing, insider trading makes the JSE a risky and less desirable investment avenue. Worst of all, it perpetuates South Africa's image abroad as a haven for pirates and crooks.
And this doesn't apply only to the smallest of private shareholders. Larger institutional investors, too, are often unable to give attention to - or act on - market gossip. Overall, the majority loses out.
Take the notorious case of life assured Crusader Life. Odd trading patterns around the time of its 1993 liquidation are still under investigation by the Office for Serious Economic Offences (Oseo). It's one of only two cases that now face prosecution - two others were discarded recently by the attorney general - though there are more in the pipeline.
And a new Insider Trading Bill is on its way to becoming law. It will hand authority for insider trading regulation from the Securities Regulatory Panel (SRP) to the more powerful and better-funded Financial Services Board (FSB).
Insider trading became an issue when Crusader issued a healthy and encouraging interim report, yet had a R77m deficit by year-end. In the interim, Crusader directors and brothers Bob and Don Rowland had offloaded their family trust shares near the top of the market. A few months later, Crusader's controlling shareholders admitted the shares were almost worthless.
A look at Crusader's share graph is all it takes to see that shareholders, a mixture of individuals and institutions, had good reason to be unhappy. The share price plummet after Crusader's predicament was revealed was dramatic - from 375c in February to 135c only two months later.
No wonder JSE shareholders are irate that the case has taken so long to finalise. But it would be unfair to accuse either the SRP or Oseo of procrastination. The delay is caused in part by problematic legislation.
So far, insiders trading laws and regulators have been hopelessly ineffectual. Current legislation - Section 440(f) of the 1973 Companies Act - has the right aims but three important problems: the legislation deals only with shares and not with other financial instruments; it requires almost unrealistic proof that traders bought or sold shares on inside information; and the imprecision of some definitions makes them difficult to apply.
True, says SRP executive director Richard Connellan bitterly. "I admit I am as biased as hell. We haven't convicted anyone but the law made it almost impossible. We will gladly co-operate with the FSB. But I am disappointed we didn't retain the insider trading regulatory function; the changes we initiated are imminent and only now is effective action possible."
In the past, says Connellan, the SRP could frequently prove the trader had the knowledge, and that he dealt in the shares. "But we had to prove indisputably that he dealt on the basis of the knowledge. That was one difficult part. The other stumbling block was the attorney general's office. He never wanted to take on the cases. Our files went to the bottom of the pile and were forgotten."
Loubser admits regulators had to cope with toothless laws and too few staff. Whatever the reason, enforcement has been patently ineffective. "Why should I give a stuff about new legislation?" asks a broker understandably not wishing to be named. "Current law is a joke. No-one will take it seriously until there's been one successful prosecution."
The examples are numerous. What has happened to the investigation of Automakers, the Sanlam-controlled car manufacturer that had a disastrous and short-lived listing in 1996 and 1997? It seems there were market players who knew something about Automakers' fate before the rest of us learnt of it.
By the time Automakers had announced its delisting in early 1997, the share price had started to rocket. Trading volumes, having dwindled in late 1996, suddenly jumped.
Still, it's not always easy to prove insider trading played a part in unusual share price movement. Hoechst financial director Johan Kok agrees that the group's share movements were unusual before its German holding company announced this year its intention to buy out minority shareholders and delist the SA company.
But, he says, the combination of a cautionary that had been announced in March and an article in the FM speculating on Hoechst's likely delisting and the sale of a local division were the main causes of the counter's rise. "Some analysts started putting two and two together, and speculated that Hoechst would be delisted," he says. "There was a hell of a lot of speculation in the market."
He may well be right - at least partly. But it's well known that merger and acquisition activity is a popular time for unusual trading patterns on the JSE. FSB staff at the SRP during the transition of authority is already working on recent suspicious cases. They are, of course, limited in their work by current legislation.
Still, only the naive would imagine that new legislation will result in immediate convictions. But market players not yet aware of the potential of new law had better wake up. Things are about to change.
"Any broker who imagines that life will continue as normal after the new law is implemented will be sorely tested," says JSE legal counsel Nicky Newton-King, who took part in drawing up the new law.
The Insider Trading Bill is much stricter than current legislation. Probably the most significant change - and the most controversial - is that the FSB can apply civil rather than criminal procedures to enforce the legislation.
In short, this makes it more likely that the court will be able to convict and penalise wrongdoers than the current criminal remedy accepted by the courts for insider trading. Civil penalties are a maximum of triple the insider trading profit. Powers of investigation are boosted. And, says FSB deputy head Rob Barrow, "through powers of subpoena we will be able to identify the beneficiaries of nominee accounts."
With these new laws, it will also make a difference that enforcement shifts from the much-maligned SRP to the FSB. It has more staff, better technology and more funds. The new law allows the FSB better communication than previously with the JSE's surveillance team.
Contrarians regularly come up with arguments defending the theory of inside information. Allowing news to spread uncurbed, they say, is in the best interests of investors who are able to gain swift access to company information. The spread of news along market networks doesn't take long. This increases market efficiency. Don't legislate; in fact, encourage it.
In practice, theories mean little to investors who realise they are losing out because of the inside knowledge of others. The effects of insider trading - particularly for the losers - sound good in theory only. Pro-insider traders are willing to acknowledge that "outsiders" lose out. That's a pity, they agree. But inevitable, and good for the JSE in the long run.
Unfortunately, this argument misses the point. Investors have a choice. Markets in the most developed countries legislate severely against insider trading. The result is simple: it happens much less than in SA.
Even then, the latest changes to the law, however laudable, aren't sufficient. Regulators of SA markets still face tremendous difficulties. Take the unnecessary complication of having two ministries responsible for financial regulation, for example. Trade & Industry controls the Companies Act, while Finance is responsible for other market legislation.
To eliminate the gaps in the system, this must urgently be simplified. Finance, now responsible for the bulk of financial market regulation and administration, seems the obvious choice.
For whatever reason - the allegations are many - those few cases referred to attorneys-general's offices don't seem to go much further than that. This is extremely frustrating to market regulators who argue that only watertight cases are submitted. Problems may include lack of interest from attorneys-general or insufficient evidence for prosecutions.
Whatever the case, communication and working structures between offices of attorneys-general and the FSB must still be improved.
Jurisdiction over the Internet, a useful site for insider traders, needs to be considered in legislation.
The shield of anonymity given to traders who deal through nominee companies must also be removed. That kind of protection complicates detection of trading fraud. An upcoming amendment to the Companies Act reduces the legal holdings of nominees in any company to 5%. Not bad. But it is still 5% too far. Where, when they are needed, are the DTIs transforming teeth?
On a similar theme, the FSB must communicate with investors. Regular bulletins or published announcements should detail the number of cases under investigation and progress in bringing offenders to book. Until they are proven guilty, no names need be mentioned. Communication will, however, act as a warning of the FSB's presence.
Take note: there will be no possibility of anonymity for convicted offenders. "That's one of my contributions," says Barrow with some satisfaction.
By: Michelle Joubert
| Top of page |
Volume TWO Chapter SIX
Special Investigation into Project Coast
SOUTH AFRICA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMME
n INTRODUCTION
1 The Commission's hearings into South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare programme (the CBW programme, also known as Project Coast) during the 1980s and early 1990s were held in Cape Town in June and July 1998. The hearings focused on the apparently offensive (as opposed to defensive) aspects of the programme. The image of white-coated scientists, professors, doctors, dentists, veterinarians, laboratories, universities and front companies, propping up apartheid with the support of an extensive international network, was a particularly cynical and chilling one. Here was evidence of science being subverted to cause disease and undermine the health of communities. Cholera, botulism, anthrax, chemical poisoning and the large-scale manufacture of drugs of abuse, allegedly for purposes of crowd control, were amongst the projects of the programme. Moreover, chemicals, poisons and lethal micro-organisms were produced for use against individuals, and ‘applicators’ (murder weapons) developed for their administration.
2 The CBW programme,
which was developed and supported by scientists, health professionals, research laboratories and front companies, fell under the nominal control of the surgeon-general of the armed forces. Ostensibly designed and conducted to support a ‘defensive capability’ in response to perceived external threats and international developments, the CBW programme displayed numerous bizarre aberrations of policy, management and intent. Overall approval and budget control lay with a central management committee which included the chief of staff of the defence force, the chief of staff of intelligence, the surgeon general as project manager and the project leader, Dr Wouter Basson. It became clear at the hearing that the overall command by the surgeon general and his colleagues on the co-ordinating committee was either ignored, or alternatively that they themselves were complicit in the programme's criminal aberrations.
3 One of the curious aspects of the CBW programme was the high level of respect it enjoyed with the military and the government of the day. The facts, as they emerged in the Commission's hearings, show that this respect was misplaced. The scientific research undertaken by the project was pedestrian, misdirected, ineffectual and unproductive. It was also exorbitantly expensive, costing the nation tens if not hundreds of millions of rands. Moreover, the evidence that emerged at the Commission's hearings demonstrates that it resulted in the substantial self-enrichment of several of the individuals involved.
4 The investigation began with a single amnesty application, a small number of confiscated technical documents relating to the programme and documentation from the Commission’s Research Department. It expanded into a comprehensive exposé, based on more than 150 documents, affidavits, amnesty applications and interviews. The results provide a basis for further investigation of the individuals involved and their apparently unprofessional and criminal activities. They also ensure that such aberrations in national policy and individual behaviour are chronicled and prevented from happening again. In this regard, there may also be lessons for the international community.
n METHODOLOGY
5 The Commission's exploration of the South African Defence Force (SADF) chemical and biological warfare programme began in 1996 with a top secret briefing by Mr Mike Kennedy of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the surgeon general, Dr D.P.Knobel, to a select group of Commission officials who had received security clearance from the NIA. The gist of the briefing was that although South Africa had had a CBW capability in the past, it had been defensive in nature and had subsequently been dismantled.
6 After this briefing, the Research Department began to look at the background to the programme and its implications, relying on the information that was available. This included press clippings, a few intelligence reports and some information gathered by Mr Claus De Jonge who was asked to look at the programme in Europe. The Research Department then drew up a list of anti-apartheid activists who had been the target of poisonings or suspected poisonings (for example, the attempted assassination of the Reverend Frank Chikane in 1989). This led the Commission to conclude that toxins may have been used by the security forces in their war against the 'total onslaught', a conclusion later corroborated by former operatives of the SADF.
7 The arrest of Dr Basson and the seizure of four trunks containing documents related to Project Coast in January 1997 provided the Commission with proof that there was more to the programme than had initially met the eye. The Commission was one of four interested groups with access to the trunks, the other three being the Office for Serious Economic Offences, the Gauteng Attorney-General's Special Investigation Team and the NIA. An agreement was struck between the parties that the Commission would have unhindered access to the information in the trunks.
8 In 1997, the Commission decided to call the project officer, Dr Basson, for a section 29 in camera hearing, in an attempt to glean more information about the programme and its relation to human rights abuses. Before the subpoena could be enforced, the Attorney General and the NIA approached the Commission. The Commission was persuaded that enforcing the subpoena could be detrimental to the case that the Attorney General was building against Dr Basson, and that it could jeopardise state security. The Commission was requested to hold a meeting with the Deputy President, which would be organised by the NIA, to discuss these matters. The Commission agreed and Dr Basson was informed that he would not be required to appear before an investigative hearing at that stage.
9 A series of meetings between the Commission and the NIA took place but no meeting with the Deputy President was forthcoming. The Commission issued a second subpoena to Dr Basson in February 1997. Again, the NIA intervened and the Commission agreed not to enforce the subpoena until it had consulted with the necessary parties.
10 By August 1997, two related amnesty applications had been identified. The Commission could no longer postpone its investigation into the CBW programme. It had become clear that investigating only the two amnesty applications and not the operations of the programme in general would represent a neglect of the Commission's duty to uncover the truth.
11 It was therefore agreed that an in-depth investigation would be conducted, starting in February 1998. At that stage there were only four months remaining before the Commission would have to conclude all its investigative work.
12 Discussions with the office of the Attorney General again revealed a concern that the Commission's investigation would have a negative impact on its prosecution of Dr Basson. It was clear that an overlap between the two investigations could not be avoided. The group of scientists with information about the programme was small and the amount of information available consequently limited. Although the Commission assured the Attorney General on a number of occasions that it did not intend to damage his case in any way, progress was slow and at no stage was information shared between the two offices. The NIA continued to share the concerns of the Attorney General and had additional concerns that it believed to be even more serious. This made for a slow and painful beginning to the investigation, requiring more negotiation than investigation.
13 The Office for Serious Economic Offences was, however, very helpful. Although it expressed doubts about the Commission's ability to complete an investigation of such magnitude in so short a period of time, it provided enough information and assistance to guide the Commission in the right direction. Access to documents from the trunks also proved vital to the Commission's case.
14 The first real investigative steps involved setting up a number interviews with a wide range of people. In order to make a start, a core group of important individuals was identified. During a series of debriefings with this group and an examination of the vast and confusing evidence that was being gathered, the true complexity of the programme began to emerge. It was soon realised that the limited scientific knowledge available in the Commission was simply not sufficient to help it understand the implications of the research documents from Roodeplaat Research Laboratories and Delta G Scientific. It also became clear that the focus of the investigations would have to be restricted considerably, since time was at a premium and the subject matter was vast.
15 Professor Peter Folb, head of the Pharmacology Department at the University of Cape Town, was approached and agreed to provide the Commission with assistance. With his expert help, the Commission was able to decipher the relevant documents and begin to develop a complete picture of the bizarre type of science that was conducted by these military front companies.
16 A computer database of all documents relevant to the investigation was developed and the Commission continued to conduct interviews with scientists and others involved in the programme. It was clear that the hearing (planned for 8 to 12 June 1998) would not be able to touch on all aspects of the investigation. It was decided, therefore, in discussion with the legal officer of the Commission and the commissioners, that the focus of the hearing should be further limited. The potential witness list was also re-examined and a final, shortened list decided upon.
17 Two weeks before the hearing was due to take place, government, in the person of the Deputy Minister of Defence, requested a meeting with the Commission to discuss the sensitivity of the hearing. A series of meetings with high level government representatives, including the offices of the President, the Deputy President, the Minister of Defence, the NIA and the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ensued. It became clear that there were two reasons for the government’s concern about a public hearing. First, that it could violate international obligations in relation to the international proliferation of chemical and biological weapons; and second, that it could jeopardise international relations with countries which may have assisted the programme but with whom South Africa continues to have diplomatic relations. This culminated in a representation by government that the hearing be held in camera, a suggestion that was declined. However, provision was made for the presence of a legal representative on behalf of government to ensure that no information was released that could lead to proliferation.
n RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION
Individual poisonings
18 The discovery of a document which has become known as the ‘Verkope lys’ (sales list) and a list of SADF sponsored (‘hard’) projects conducted at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories provided the Commission with a clear indication that there was an intent to poison individuals, and that the front company, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, was involved in the development of the toxins used for this purpose. Dr André Immelman, head researcher on SADF projects at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, authored the list, found amongst the documents seized at the time of Dr Basson’s arrest. Dr Immelman provided the Commission with an affidavit that confirms that he authored the list at a time when he had been required, at Dr Basson's request, to provide a group of individuals with the toxins. The items on the list include anthrax in cigarettes, botulinum in milk and paraoxon in whiskey — in the Commission’s view clearly murder weapons. This was, indeed, conceded by witnesses at the hearing and Dr Knobel went so far as to say that, in his view, such a list could not form part of a legitimate defensive programme. The inclusion of a baboon foetus on the list, dated late July 1989 (just prior to such a foetus being found in the garden of Archbishop Tutu's house), as well as a reference to chemical and biological operatives, indicated that the items may well have found their way, directly or indirectly, into the hands of operatives of the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB).
19 Discussions with members of the CCB indicated that operatives were not necessarily aware of the existence of a CBW programme. They were, however, aware of the capacity of the SADF doctors to provide them with toxins. A member of the Directorate of Covert Collection who explained to investigators that there was an understanding in their unit that they could get toxins from Dr Basson corroborated this.
Street drugs
20 Documents seized at the time of Dr Basson's arrest indicated that the front company, Delta G Scientific, was involved in the manufacture of significant quantities of methaqualone (mandrax) and ecstasy, and was also involved in researching the possibility of using street drugs for crowd control purposes. This was corroborated at the hearing.
21 It was also established that approximately 1 000kg of ecstasy was manufactured in 1992 and was, in all likelihood, encapsulated by Medchem Pharmaceuticals, a subsidiary of the holding company Medchem Consolidated Investments, under which Delta G Scientific also fell. The production manager at Delta G Scientific informed investigators that he had been approached in 1988 by the managing director of the company, Dr Philip Mijburgh, and asked to produce 1 000kg of methaqualone. It is not certain whether this was also encapsulated, but it seems likely. The explanation given by witnesses was that the intention was to use it for crowd control purposes. General Lothar Neethling told the Commission during the hearing that, on three occasions, he had been requested to provide Dr Basson with mandrax tablets confiscated by the South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB). He claimed that he had given Dr Basson approximately 200 000 tablets in total as well as quantities of LSD and dagga, on the understanding that they would be investigated to determine whether they would be appropriate crowd control weapons. None of the witnesses could provide the Commission with any information about tests that had been conducted in this regard and at least one witness stated that these drugs would not be suitable for such a purpose.
22 In August 1988, Delta G Scientific began producing 1 000kg of methaqualone. From the documentation provided by DrKnobel, it seems that tests were carried out on methaqualone as an incapacitate in 1988, and that it was established that it was not effective since it did not take effect immediately. As a result, work on methaqualone stopped at the end of 1988 but work on methaqualone analogues continued. What happened to the 1 000 kg of methaqualone has still not been established. Moreover, at the end of 1991, the Co-ordinating Management Committee of Project Coast saw fit to send Dr Basson to Croatia to close a deal with renegade Croatians (including high-ranking government officials) for the purchase of 500kg of methaqualone, which was brought back to South Africa.
23 A year later, this was allegedly destroyed after an order that work on all incapacitants should cease. The deal in Croatia was in itself extremely questionable, leading to a loss of millions of rands. Dr Basson intercepted Vatican bearer bonds to the value of $40 million that had been intended for the purchase of weapons by the Croatian government, leading to his arrest in Switzerland. Why the military was importing such large quantities of methaqualone at such high cost at this late stage of negotiations is not clear and was not adequately answered by Dr Knobel or Dr Basson. The documents also cast doubt on whether these substances were in fact destroyed on 27 January 1993, as alleged.
24 Investigations could not trace the drugs produced at Delta G directly to the street. However, Dr Basson was arrested with quantities of ecstasy and mandrax tablets in his possession, and the Steyn report indicates that Dr Basson allegedly offered an operative mandrax tablets in return for an operation. The Commission has a strong suspicion that drugs obtained during the course of this programme may well have found their way onto the streets.
Mozambican incident
25 In January 1992, FRELIMO troops conducted an operation near the South African border. During the course of the operation, they were allegedly exposed to what was thought to have been a chemical agent. Some of the soldiers died during the incident and others required hospitalisation.
26 A submission by General Pierre Steyn stated that South Africans launched an attack from Komatipoort as a training exercise. Investigators were unable to determine the accuracy of this information, as use of the Komatipoort airstrip is not regulated.
27 After the incident, a series of investigations were conducted by scientific teams from South Africa, Mozambique, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The reports were inconclusive. The only report that expressed a belief that the troops had been exposed to a chemical agent was that of the British scientist. A United Nations investigation was launched and was also unable to come to any firm conclusions.
28 Dr Brian Davy, who had been the head of the South African investigating team, spoke to Professor Peter Folb during the course of the Commission investigation and was unable to provide any further information. Attempts to meet with the British scientist failed. Attempts were also made to access the medical records of the soldiers involved. However, the Mozambican authorities failed to respond to Commission's requests for information. Investigators met with Dr Staub, a member of both the Swiss and the United Nations investigating team. He told them that he believed that the troops had suffered dehydration and had not been the victims of a chemical attack. This explanation struck the Commission's investigation unit as unlikely.
29 Investigators also met with Dr Vernon Joynt of Mechem, which could have manufactured the carrier for such a weapon. This interview did not provide any new information of significance.
30 Unfortunately, the matter remains unresolved.
International links and support
31 Documents in the Commission's possession indicate that Dr Basson travelled extensively to collect information during the initial phase of the CBW programme. He visited Taiwan where he was shown their CBW facilities and provided with significant information, and also attended a conference at San Antonio in the United States in the early 1980s. Documents indicate that, during the apartheid years, members of the SADF visited Israel and West Germany to share information about CBW matters and there was clearly a link with Belgian nationals and companies. Other documents reveal links between the surgeon general and Americans who were part of the United States CBW programme, and demonstrate their willingness to assist the South Africans.
32 Dr Basson and other members of the programme travelled extensively. Their links with sanctions busters and other people prepared to assist the South African CBW programme, both officially and unofficially, cannot be doubted. Dr Basson's trips to Croatia during the 1992/3 periods indicate that he had a number of contacts throughout the world who could provide assistance in one way or another.
33 By the end of 1993, the United States and British governments approached the South African government to express concern about the programme. The motives for the meetings between these two governments and the South Africans are unclear. At the hearing, both Dr Basson and Dr Knobel alleged that the British and Americans had informed them that they did not want the programme to fall into the hands of the ANC government after the election in April 1994. Dr Basson visited the US in 1981 and Dr Knobel had contact with scientists who were part of the American CBW programme much later; the existence of a South African programme was no secret to the Americans or the British. A further indication of such a relationship is a visit by Dr Brian Davey, a medical doctor and former member of the South African Medical Services (SAMS), to Porten Down in 1992, after the alleged attack on Mozambican forces (see above).
34 The role of foreign governments in supporting the South African programme is not yet clear. It cannot however be doubted that, without some level of foreign assistance, this programme would not have been possible.
n FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT
35 There is evidence of large-scale fraud and mismanagement of funds of the CBW programme, which is the subject of an extensive investigation by the Office for Serious Economic Offences (OSEO). The Attorney General provided the Commission with an interim charge sheet that reveals an intention to charge Dr Basson with fraud amounting to R50 million. Because fraud and theft of funds do not form part of the Commission's mandate, and because this is the subject of an investigation by the OSEO, the Commission did not extensively investigate this aspect. It did, however, become clear in the course of our investigations and through evidence given at the hearing that the programme was fraught with financial irregularities.
n INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE CBW PROGRAMME
Military
36 A management committee (beheerkomitee) was established to oversee the management of the CBW programme. It included the chief of the SADF, chief of staff finances, head of counter-intelligence, chief of staff intelligence, the surgeon-general and the project officer (Dr Basson). The management committee had three working groups: a technical working group, a security group and a group responsible for administration and finances. According to documents provided by Dr Knobel (which include a number of minutes from the meetings of this committee), once the front companies were established and running, the committee met once a year to approve the project's budget and as needed in the case of emergencies.
37 The surgeon general acted as project leader, a role that is unclear at this stage. Dr Basson was project officer and apparently reported both to the surgeon general and the head of Special Forces, and variously to the Minister of Defence, chief of the SADF, Minister of Police, commissioner of police and the chief of staff intelligence.
38 Front companies were established to do the work of the programme, with the SADF as the main client. They were also provided with covert funding from the SAMS budget during the earlier period of the programme.
39 No one at the hearing was prepared to take direct responsibility for the programme and responsibility has been passed both up and down. It is the Commission's view that, while Dr Basson was clearly a central figure, several of the people involved in the beheerkomitee cannot deny responsibility. Unfortunately, the exact responsibility for the programme could not be determined.
n ANALYSIS
40 The CBW programme in the 1980s and early 1990s was ostensibly established for the purpose of providing the country with a defensive capability. By this it was understood that there should be the necessary expertise to understand and to be able to react to chemical and biological threats posed from outside the country's borders. South Africa should also have the capacity to launch retaliatory attacks in the event of CBW agents being used against South Africa's own forces.
41 It was explicitly and repeatedly stated that the intention was not, and never had been, to develop an offensive capacity. Such intent would have been evidenced by large-scale production at factory level, the manufacture of missiles capable of dispersing chemical and biological substances amongst enemy troops (‘weaponisation’) and the training of troops in their use. There would also have been at least limited evidence of the use of such agents in warfare.
42 The exception to this was the express intention of the military to develop crowd control agents. These included standard agents for the purposes of self-sufficiency and novel agents developed through the adaptation of chemicals already in existence. There is also invariably some overlap between defensive and offensive programmes. Although never explained in precise terms, this may be the reason for surplus production volumes.
43 In strict military terms, such a defensive programme would need to be managed in accordance with each of a number of criteria. These would include careful compliance with the criteria of defensive capability, sound and disciplined leadership, careful auditing of financial dealings, compliance with international conventions determining the conduct of such military business and reliable and comprehensive systems of accountability. The Commission's hearings showed that the programme failed to meet each and every one of these criteria. In fact, there was consistent evidence of serious departures from these standards.
44 Despite the fact that the South African CBW programme during the period under review has now been exposed as showing gross aberrations of intent, discipline, actions, command structures, financial dealings and professional relationships, it was highly regarded within the military, which considered it a successful programme. The military command maintained that cognoscenti in the international military community shared this opinion. One of the astonishing aspects that emerged in the hearings was that the professionalism, competence and mystique of the programme were stripped away by the evidence of the very people who participated in it. The hearings revealed a nepotistic, self-serving and self-enriching group of people, misled by those who had a technical grasp of what was happening. They conducted work they deemed to be scientific, but which was underpinned by ideas, suggestions and hypotheses that were bizarre and incompetent.
45 Dr Basson’s evidence was not fully tested at the hearings because of the legal objections he raised with regard to his forthcoming criminal trial. Initially, Dr Basson's legal representatives indicated that they wished to bring a legal challenge to prevent their client from testifying at the hearing. The panel presiding over the hearing ruled, however, that Dr Basson was compelled to testify. This decision was challenged in the Cape High Court. The court upheld the panel's ruling and ordered Dr Basson to testify before the Commission on 29 July 1998, a mere three days before the mandate to hold human rights violations hearings expired.
46 On 29 July 1998, Dr Basson appeared before the Commission without his Pretoria-based legal representatives and asked that the hearing be postponed until they were available. Ultimately, Dr Basson's evidence was only heard on 31 July. Much of the time was spent on legal argument, and the extent of questioning was curtailed.
47 Although Dr Basson gave evidence for almost twelve hours, the Commission would have preferred to have had an opportunity to question him more thoroughly. In the event, many questions were left unanswered.
48 Dr Immelman, who served as director of the scientific research programme at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories during its existence as a front company for the conduct of the CBW programme, submitted an affidavit. A thorough testing of his evidence must now await his cross-examination in court. It is clear from Dr Immelman's affidavit that he was directly responsible for the production of items on the ‘Verkope lys’; that he dealt directly with operatives, and that he is accountable for the scientific content of the Roodeplaat Research Laboratories programme in the years in which he held office — in the mid- and late 1980s and the early 1990s. In addition to the obvious issues of professional culpability, negligence and criminal intent that apply to others as well, it has to be said specifically of Dr Immelman that he allegedly had full knowledge of the activities at the laboratories that were under his control.
49 Inevitably, the CBW programme achieved little of value or of common good. Enveloped as it was by secrecy, threats and fear, opportunism, financial mismanagement, incompetence, self-aggrandisement, together with a breakdown in the normal methods of scientific discourse, the results were paltry. Tens, even hundreds, of millions of rands were squandered on ideas that had no scientific validity. At best, the programme succeeded in producing for manufacture analogues of CR and BZ incapacitants, and in making local arrangements for protective clothing for troops against mass chemical and biological attack. At worst, the programme had criminal intent.
n FINDINGS
The Commission finds that:
• Scientists were recruited to the CBW programme from universities and research institutions in South Africa because of their ‘patriotism’ and loyalty to the government of the day. They were lured by generous conditions of service, facilities, working arrangements and pay packages.
• Work was conducted on a ‘need to know’ basis, subverting the very purpose of science. The free discourse of information and ideas that characterises scientific endeavour was subverted. Moreover, those who were appointed were intimidated and threatened, even with their lives, if they stepped out of line.
• Overall understanding of the programme, and its co-ordination and direction, were vested in the hands of one person, Dr Basson, whose ability and (it is assumed) integrity were unquestioned both by those who served under him and by those to whom he had to report. It emerged in the hearings that the military command was dependent on Dr Basson for the conduct and command of the programme, even at a time when there were sufficient indications that Dr Basson might not be trustworthy and that there were serious aberrations in what was happening.
• The military command, and pre-eminently the surgeon general, Dr DP Knobel, were grossly negligent in approving programmes and allocating large sums of money for activities of which they had no understanding, and which they made no effort to understand.
• The CBW programme made the self-enrichment of individuals possible and opened the way for a cynical subversion of its ostensible aims in the production of murder weapons for use against individuals.
• A extremely complicated arrangement of front companies supported the programme, a part of whose intention was a plan for its own ultimate privatisation. This, it appears, was intended from the start.
• The development of the programme would not have been possible without some level of international co-operation and support.
The role of the management committee
• The CBW programme, and in particular its gross aberrations, would not have succeeded without the support, active and tacit, of the Co-ordinating Management Committee over the period 1988 to 1995.
• The Committee knew of the large-scale production of mandrax and ecstasy and their purported use, but did not seek to establish reasons for this. It approved of the idea and lent its support directly. The idea of using either mandrax or ecstasy for the purpose of crowd control contravenes international codes. In addition, there was no scientific basis for thinking that it would be an appropriate, safe or sensible form of crowd control.
• The Committee was aware of and authorised Basson's trips to Croatia, at great expense, to purchase 500kg of methaqualone as late as 1992, and assisted Basson when he was arrested in Switzerland in possession of fraudulent bearer bonds.
The surgeon general in particular:
• Knew of the production of murder weapons but refused to address the concerns that were raised with him, on the grounds that they did not fall under his authority. He was nevertheless fully aware that these activities happened in facilities under his direct control and were perpetrated by staff under his chain of command.
• Did not understand, by his own admission, the medical, chemical and technical aspects and implications of a programme that cost tens, if not hundreds of millions of rands.
• Made no effort to come to grips with these technical and medical issues, notwithstanding the fact that he was the highest-ranking medical professional in the military and that others in the military were wholly dependent on his judgement and discretion.
• advised the Minister of Defence, on 7 January 1993, that South Africa should conceal from the Chemical Weapons Convention that the country possessed NGT (a new generation of tear gas related closely to CR), recommending that South Africa should proceed with the research and development of NGT in a covert manner while at the same time concealing it.
• Approved the budget for projects (in some cases alone, and in others in con junction with his fellow officers on the management committee, with or without the full understanding of what he was doing) that had as their purpose the murder of individuals, and the undermining of the health, if not the elimination, of entire communities (for example, projects involving cholera, fertility drugs, botulinum, mandrax and ecstasy).
• Agreed to the destruction of documents describing the activities and the financial aspects of these programmes. Instead, he should have ensured that the details of the programme were recorded and accessible, while limiting their accessibility to authorised persons. This would have safeguarded the massive investment, both financial and in terms of scientific achievement, while, on the other hand, guarding against use of the information for purposes of proliferation or criminal activities.
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